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THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE EXTENDS
ANTILAPSE-TYPE PROTECTION TO POORLY
DRAFTED TRUSTS
Lawrence W. Waggoner*
The Uniform Law Commission' promulgated a revised version of
Article II of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC or Code) in 1990, and ap-
proved a set of technical amendments in 1993. As Director of Research
and Chief Reporter for the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform
Probate Code (Board)2 and reporter for the UPC Article II drafting
committee, I was privileged to serve as the principal drafter of these
provisions. UPC Article II deals with the substantive rules governing
donative transfers - intestacy; spouse's elective share; execution, revo-
cation, and revival of wills; rules of construction for wills and other
donative transfers; and perpetuities. In all, UPC Article II contains
eighty-five provisions, many of them brand new. The initial project took
about four years to complete.
I. SECrION 2-707
In this article, I propose briefly to discuss one of the new provi-
sions - section 2-707. 3 I write this article because a prominent law
teacher, Jesse Dukeminier, has published an article in this journal op-
posing this section. 4 I address Professor Dukeminier's critique in Parts
II and III. First, however, I discuss section 2-707 itself.
* Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Director of Re-
search, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code. - Ed. Copyright © 1996
by Lawrence W. Waggoner. The author wishes to thank Mary Louise Fellows, Edward
C. Halbach, Jr., John H. Langbein, and Richard V. Wellman for helpful suggestions on
an earlier draft and Nancy Nearing Go and Ariella Nasuti for valuable research assis-
tance in preparing this article.
1. Short for National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
2. The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code (Board) is an organiza-
tion jointly sponsored by the Uniform Law Commission, the American Bar Association,
and the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
3. UIaF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 (1993). For a more comprehensive treatment of § 2-
707 and related provisions, see Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091 (1992).
4. Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remainders,
94 Micu. L. R~v. 148 (1995). I sometimes refer to this article in the text as "Upending
Remainders."
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Section 2-707 establishes a rule of construction for carrying out the
donor's intention when a remainder beneficiary of a trust dies before
the distribution date.5 The distribution date is the time when the remain-
der interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment. 6 As a practical
matter, the distribution date usually occurs when the life tenant dies.
This is when the trust is dissolved, and the corpus is distributed. If a re-
mainder beneficiary dies before the distribution date, section 2-707
gives the corpus directly to the beneficiary's descendants who are then
living. Section 2-707 replaces the rule at common law that sends the
corpus back through the probate estate of the predeceased remainder
beneficiary, a rule that can disinherit a descending line that has living
members on the distribution date and can send a share down a descend-
ing line that previously died out.
Section 2-707 only applies to poorly drafted trusts. Well-drafted
trusts, as described in more detail below, will not be affected by section
2-707 because they expressly provide for alternate takers if a remainder
beneficiary dies before the distribution date. Section 2-707 treats an ex-
press provision in the trust document that designates alternate takers as
controlling, and comes into operation only if the trust document fails to
produce an alternative taker.7 By substituting the descendants of a re-
mainder beneficiary of a poorly drafted trust who dies before the distri-
bution date, section 2-707 carries out common intention - and the ob-
jective of most well-drafted trusts - by making sure that no
descending line having a living member on the distribution date is dis-
inherited,8 and that no share is sent down a descending line that previ-
ously died out.
5. A rule of construction is not a mandatory rule of law, but is a default rule de-
signed to carry out presumed intent. A rule of construction yields to a finding of a con-
trary intent. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-701 (1993); RESTATEmNT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY
(DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 11.3(a) cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995). This was ap-
proved by the American Law Institute at the 1995 Annual Meeting. 72 A.L.I. PRoc. 65
(1996).
6. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(a)(4) (1993).
7. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b)(4) (1993). For illustrations, see infra notes 17
and 89.
8. The Restatement of Property and the case law have long recognized a construc-
tional preference for not disinheriting a line of descent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 11.3(c)(3) cmt. j & reporter's note 6 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1995). This was approved by the American Law Institute at the 1995 An-
nual Meeting. 72 A.L.I. PRoc. 65 (1996). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 243
cmt. f (1940).
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A. Well-Drafted Trusts
The means employed in well-drafted trusts to preserve a share for
each descending line having a living member on the distribution date,
while not benefiting a descending line that previously died out, is to
craft future interests in the form of multiple-generation class gifts with
a survival requirement. Inasmuch as most future interests are to a class
rather than to a named individual,9 it is usually wiser to craft the class
gift as one to a multiple-generation class ("issue" or "descendants"), 10
not as one to a single-generation class ("children," "grandchildren,"
"nieces and nephews," and so on)."
To illustrate how this technique serves to implement common in-
tention, suppose a remainder to the "descendants" of the life tenant, A,
with a survival requirement. If the life tenant, A, had two children, X
and Y, and X predeceased the life tenant but Y survived the life tenant,
Y would take it all if X left no descendants surviving the life tenant, but
X's descendants would divide X's half if X left descendants surviving
the life tenant. A single-generation class gift with a survival require-
ment can, in contrast, disinherit a descending line that has living mem-
bers at the distribution date. If the remainder had been to A's "chil-
dren" with a survival requirement, Y would take the whole and X's
estate would take nothing even if X left descendants surviving the life
tenant. A single-generation class gift without a survival requirement can
send a share down a descending line that has no living members at the
distribution date. If the remainder had been to A's "children" without a
survival requirement, Y would only take half and X's estate would take
the other half even if X left no descendants surviving the life tenant.
Because a well-drafted trust imposes a survival requirement, and
thus does not create transmissible future interests, the trust must provide
for the possibility that no remainder beneficiary will survive the distri-
bution date. To assure that the corpus will always go directly to living
beneficiaries when the trust is dissolved, a well-drafted trust provides
for one or more alternative future interests, each of which is expressly
9. Future interests to named individuals are usually created when the donor does
not anticipate that any additional persons in the same relationship will be born or
adopted, such as remainders to the donor's children or to the donor's brothers and
sisters.
10. Equivalent language is sometimes used, such as "to divide the trust estate into
equal shares, one for each child then living and one for the then-living descendants of
each child then deceased."
11. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions
of Survival (pt. 2), 49 CAL. L. REV. 431, 469-70 (1961).
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contingent on the beneficiary surviving the distribution date. 12 The last
of the alternative future interests will be fail safe. If none of the pre-
ferred beneficiaries survives the distribution date, the trust will direct
the corpus to a beneficiary or a set of beneficiaries certain to exist at
the life tenant's death: one or more established charities, the persons
who would be the donor's heirs were the donor to have died when the
life tenant died, or the life tenant's heirs.
For clients who want to give a beneficiary flexibility to change
who gets the property when the trust is dissolved, and allow a benefici-
ary to achieve certain tax objectives, capable estate planners would con-
fer a power of appointment on the life tenant. The set of alternative re-
mainder interests would still control the distribution of corpus, but only
to the extent that the life tenant does not exercise the power.
B. Transmissible Future Interests at Common Law
A statutory reform is successful if it advances the law by giving a
desirable result in a greater proportion of cases than the law it re-
places. 13 The law that section 2-707 replaces is the rule of construction
favoring early vesting, a rule that produces transmissible future interests
at common law. A corollary of the constructional preference for early
vesting is the rule of construction that a remainder beneficiary need not
survive the distribution date unless the terms of the document expressly
require it. In the absence of an express requirement of survival, a re-
mainder beneficiary has a transmissible future interest - a future inter-
est that passes through the remainder beneficiary's probate estate if he
or she predeceases the distribution date.
Estate planners have long been cautioned, and capable estate plan-
ners have long understood, that they should not create transmissible fu-
ture interests. Indeed, one of the cardinal precepts of good estate plan-
ning is never to create a transmissible future interest. 14 Transmissible
12. If the first remainder goes to the life tenant's then-living descendants, a com-
mon second choice is the closest collateral line of descent (the descendants of the life
tenant's parents surviving the life tenant), followed perhaps by a third choice, the next
collateral line of descent (the descendants of the life tenant's grandparents surviving the
life tenant).
13. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1149.
14. See, e.g., 3 A. JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1041 (4th ed. 1980) ("Nor-
mally it is unwise to create in an estate plan an interest in a class member (or in an in-
dividual to whom a future interest is given) that is not subject to a requirement of sur-
vival to the date set for beneficial enjoyment."); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Future
Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival (pt. 1), 49 CAL. L. REv. 297, 307
(1961); Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Issues About Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift
Problems, 48 Mo. L. RaV. 333, 366 (1983) [hereinafter Halbach, Issues About Issue]
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future interests can cause unnecessary estate taxes, can increase admin-
istrative and tracing costs, and can allow the property to be diverted
outside the family or bloodline.
15
UPC section 2-707 will never apply to a well-drafted trust. First of
all, the section is wholly inapplicable to multiple-generation class gifts
that are expressly contingent on survival of the distribution date.'
6 Sec-
ond, the section has no effect on a future interest if the beneficiary of
an alternative future interest is entitled to take in possession or enjoy-
ment.17 As noted, well-drafted trusts always provide for a fail-safe fu-
ture interest of last resort. Consequently, UPC section 2-707 will have
no effect at all on well-drafted trusts, and capable estate planners will
not have to revise their forms. Section 2-707 only applies to poorly
drafted trusts.
Even at common law, it is important to note, transmissible future
interests only arise with respect to remainder interests to named individ-
uals or to single-generation classes. In the case of remainder interests
to multiple-generation classes, the common law does not give a prede-
ceased beneficiary a transmissible future interest. Even when the lan-
guage creating a future interest does not expressly require the benefi-
ciaries to survive the distribution date, the common law subjects a
future interest to a multiple-generation class to an implied requirement
of survival.' 8 Implying a requirement of survival for multiple-generation
class gifts supports section 2-707. Like section 2-707, it assures that no
("[lit is virtually a matter of gospel among those skilled in estate planning and in the
drafting of wills and trusts that remainder beneficiaries should be expressly required to
survive until the time of distribution, in order to avoid a premature risk of property be-
ing diverted outside of the family or bloodlines, unwarranted administration and tracing
difficulties, and unnecessary estate and inheritance taxation."); Halbach & Waggoner,
supra note 3, at 1134 ("Informed estate planners routinely impose express conditions of
survival on the beneficiaries of future interests in trusts they draft."); Daniel M.
Schuyler, Drafting, Tax, and Other Consequences of the Rule of Early Vesting, 46 ILL.
L. REV. 407, 437 (1951) ("[T]he draftsman should never [create a transmissible future
interest] to accomplish his purpose."):
15. See, e.g., Halbach, Issues About Issue, supra note 14, at 366; Edward H.
Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 467, 479-80
(1965); Schuyler, supra note 14, at 427-36; infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
16. See UNtr. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b)(2) (1993).
17. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b)(4) (1993); supra text accompanying note 7;
infra text accompanying note 69; infra note 89. For example, suppose a trust to pay the
income to A for life, remainder to B if B survives A, but if not to the American Heart
Association. If B predeceases A, the American Heart Association takes the corpus even
if B leaves descendants who survive A.
18. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Tuscaloosa, 182 So. 72 (Ala. 1938); Weller v.
Sokol, 318 A.2d 193 (Md. 1974); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Brown, 191 N.E. 358 (Mass.
1934); Kennard v. Kennard, 129 A. 725 (N.H. 1925), overruled on other grounds, 179
A. 414 (N.H. 1935). The Restatement (Second) of Property provides:
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descending line having a living member on the distribution date is dis-
inherited, and no share is sent down a line that has died out by the dis-
tribution date.
When, with respect to a remainder to a named individual or to a
single-generation class, a transmissible future interest arises at common
law, it is usually due to a drafting deficiency. A classic and recurrent
drafting deficiency is to write a condition of survival as a condition
subsequent rather than as a condition precedent. In In re Krooss,'9 the
testator's will devised his residuary estate to his wife Eliese for life,
then to his two children, John and Florence. The provision producing a
transmissible future interest was:
In the event that either of my children aforesaid should die prior to
the death of my beloved wife, Eliese Krooss, leaving descendants, then it
is my wish and I so direct that such descendants shall take the share their
parent would have taken if then living, share and share alike, to and for
their own use absolutely and forever.20
John survived his mother, but Florence predeceased her, without de-
scendants but with a surviving husband. The court held that Florence
had a transmissible future interest regarding half of her father's residu-
ary estate, which passed under her residuary clause in trust for her hus-
band. Applying the preference for early vesting, the court said:
[D]ivestiture of the remainder estates depended upon the happening of
two plainly expressed and stipulated conditions: (1) the child, Florence or
John, must die before the life beneficiary, and (2) the child so dying
must leave descendants. Only if both of those conditions came to pass
was the remainder - by apt and unequivocal language already vested in
Florence and John - to be divested and bestowed instead upon the de-
scendants of him or her who might have died.2'
Because the gift over specified Florence's descendants, it appears
doubtful that the testator understood that he was giving Florence a
transmissible future interest if she predeceased her mother without leav-
ing descendants. More likely, he thought that John or his descendants
would take Florence's share, if he thought about it at all. It also appears
doubtful that Florence or her attorney understood that she owned a
If a gift is made to a class described as the "issue" or "descendants" of a
designated person, or by a similar multigenerational class gift term, in the ab-
sence of additional language or circumstances that indicate otherwise .... [a]
class member must survive to the date of distribution in order to share in the gift
RESTA'iMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 28.2 (1987).
19. 99 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1951).
20. 99 N.E.2d at 223 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. 99 N.E.2d at 224.
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transmissible future interest that was contingent on her dying before her
mother without descendants, or that she deliberately devised it under
her residuary clause. The use of a condition subsequent disguises the
meaning that the courts, applying the early vesting rule, attribute to
such language. Had the testator's lawyer drafted the condition in the
form of a condition precedent, the testator would have understood the
meaning of what he was asked to sign, and one doubts that he would
have signed it. Had the condition been cast in the form of a condition
precedent, it would have read: "to Florence if she either survives her
mother or predeceases her mother without leaving any descendants; if
she predeceases her mother leaving descendants, then to such descend-
ants." Had section 2-707 applied to the Krooss case,22 the testator's son
John would have taken the whole directly upon Eliese's death;
Florence's husband would not have benefited from the addition of that
half share to the corpus of the residuary trust created in Florence's
will.21
Another classic and recurrent drafting deficiency leading to a
transmissible future interest at common law is writing a condition of
survival into the first future interest but neglecting to write it into one
or more alternative future interests in favor of identified individuals or
single-generation classes. A simplified illustration of this type of draft-
ing error is "income to A for life, remainder to B if B survives A, but if
not to B's children." 24 The alternative future interest to B's children is
contingent on B predeceasing A, but it is not expressly contingent on
B's children surviving A. Failure to write a condition of survival into
the alternative future interest to B's children can cause litigation if B
and one or more of B's children predecease A. The common law re-
sponse to this situation is neither monolithic nor consistent with the
well-drafted trust.
The majority rule holds that the alternative future interest is not
conditioned on survival, thus giving the beneficiaries of the alternative
future interest a transmissible future interest even if the deceased bene-
ficiaries die without issue.25 This is what happened in In re Bomberger's
Estate. 6 By applying the majority rule, the court sent shares of the trust
22. Although § 2-707 would not have applied to the devise in Krooss because it
was not in trust, the devise illustrates the type of provisions often found in poorly
drafted trusts.
23. Remember that Florence's husband would not have lost out entirely. Florence's
own residuary estate would still have gone into her residuary trust for him.
24. See Halbach, supra note 11, at 469-70.
25. See 5 AM. L. Paop. § 21.25 (A. James Casner ed., 1952); 2 LEwis M. SiMIEs &
ALLAN F. SMrrH, THE LAW OF FuuRE INTERETS §§ 594, 655 (2d ed. 1956).
26. 32 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1943).
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down descending lines that had died out by the distribution date. The
testator's will devised $50,000 in trust, income to his niece, Lilly
Aughinbaugh, for life, corpus on Lilly's death to her children. The will
continued:
Should [niece Lilly] die without leaving a child or children, I order and
direct that the bequest... shall be equally divided among my nephews
and nieces .. .then living, the child or children of nieces who may be
deceased to have the share their mother would have been entitled to if
living .... 27
As the facts turned out, Lilly died childless, never having had any chil-
dren, and all of the testator's nieces and nephews predeceased Lilly.
Ada, one of the predeceased nieces, had eight children: seven of them
survived Lilly, but one, John, predeceased Lilly. John also predeceased
his mother, Ada. Annie, the other predeceased niece, had one child,
Rachel, who predeceased Lilly. John and Rachel apparently died child-
less, although the court does not specifically so state.
The dispute arose between Ada's seven living children and the ex-
ecutors of John's and Rachel's estates. If the third remainder, the one to
the children of nieces who predeceased Lilly, was contingent on sur-
vival of Lilly, Ada's seven children would split the corpus, each receiv-
ing a one-seventh share. The court, however, held that the remainder
was not contingent on surviving Lilly. The result: Ada'9 seven living
children and John's estate split half of the corpus, one sixteenth each,
and Rachel's estate took a full one-half share. As in Krooss, the testator
probably did not understand that his disposition created transmissible
future interests in John and Rachel that were contingent on Lilly dying
without children and on their own mothers predeceasing Lilly. It also
appears doubtful that John or Rachel understood that he or she owned
such a transmissible future interest.
The minority rule holds that the alternative future interest is condi-
tioned on survival even if the deceased beneficiaries left descendants
surviving the distribution date.28 This is what happened in Lawson v.
Lawson,29 a case in which the court applied the minority rule and disin-
herited two lines of descent with living members at the distribution
date. The testator's will devised land to his daughter Opal Lawson Long
for her life, and at her death "to her children, if any, in fee simple; if
27. 32 A.2d at 730 (last alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. See 5 AM. L. PROP., supra note 25, § 21.25; 2 SIMEs & SMrrH, supra note 25,
§§ 594, 655. For a recent case applying the minority rule, see Rushing v. Mann, 910
S.W.2d 672 (Ark. 1995).
29. 148 S.E.2d 546 (N.C. 1966).
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none, to [Opal's] whole brothers and sisters."30 The will, in effect, cre-
ated a life estate in Opal, followed by alternative contingent remainders:
first, to Opal's children, if any; and second, to Opal's whole brothers
and sisters, contingent on Opal not leaving any children.
As the facts turned out, Opal died childless, and four of her six
whole brothers and sisters survived her. The other two brothers survived
the testator but predeceased Opal. One of the predeceased brothers left
a child, William, who survived Opal and claimed a one-sixth share
through his father's estate. The other predeceased brother left four chil-
dren, Leo, Kenneth, Bonnie, and Barbara, who survived Opal and col-
lectively claimed a one-sixth share through their father's estate. The
court held that the second alternative remainder was contingent on sur-
vival of Opal, and thus that the corpus went exclusively to the four sur-
viving brothers and sisters.
To summarize, neither Bomberger nor Lawson gave a result that is
consistent with a well-drafted trust. Section 2-707 cures the failure of
the common law in both cases. Were section 2-707 applicable,3 none of
the corpus in Bomberger would have gone down descending lines that
had died out, whereas in Lawson, the two lines that still had living
members would not have been disinherited.
A further complexity associated with these problems arises when a
remainder interest is subject to an express requirement of survival, but
the language is ambiguous because it does not clearly specify the time
of survival. The predominant constructional preference at common law,
as set forth in section 251 of the original Restatement of Property, is
that ambiguous language of survival "tends to" refer to the distribution
date rather than to some other time, such as the testator's death. 32 This
constructional preference makes sense when applied to a multiple-gen-
eration class gift. But, when applied to a single-generation class gift,
this constructional preference can disinherit a descending line.
A recent case, In re Gustafson,33 shows how this rule of construc-
tion can work mischief when applied to a single-generation class gift.
Carl Gustafson died leaving a will that devised about half of his estate
in two trusts, the income from one to be paid to his wife Elsie for life.
Upon Elsie's death, the corpus was to be distributed:
(a) One-half to my brother, E. Leonard Gustafson.
30. 148 S.E.2d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Although § 2-707 would not have applied to the devise in Lawson because it
was not in trust, the devise illustrates the type of provisions often found in poorly
drafted trusts.
32. See RBsTATEMBNT oF PROFErTY § 251 (1940).
33. 547 N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 1989).
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(b) One-half to my brother, Roy L. Gustafson.
(c) If a brother predeceases Elsie Warren Gustafson, then his share
of this Trust shall be paid over to his surviving child or children, share
and share alike.
(d) If one of my brothers shall predecease Elsie Warren Gustafson,
without issue surviving, then his part of this Trust shall be paid over to
his surviving brother.
34
Roy survived Elsie and took his half. Leonard predeceased Elsie, leav-
ing a daughter Jacqueline and a son Daniel surviving him. Jacqueline
survived Elsie as well, but Daniel predeceased Elsie, leaving a widow
and children who survived Elsie. Relying on Restatement of Property
section 251, the court held that the condition of survival on the interest
of Leonard's children related to Elsie's death; consequently, Jacqueline
took all of Leonard's half, and Daniel's widow and children took noth-
ing. Under UPC section 2-707, however, Jacqueline would have only
taken half of Leonard's half. Leonard's grandchildren (Daniel's chil-
dren) would have taken the other half of Leonard's half.
Coexisting with the above case law, however, is a lesser-known
line of common law authority that approaches the problem from a dif-
ferent angle. In Krooss, Bomberger, and Lawson, the question was
whether a future interest to a named individual or to a single-generation
class was conditioned on survival of the distribution date. In Gustafson,
the question was whether the ambiguous language of survival referred
to the distribution date or some other time. Under this alternative line of
authority, the courts have asked a different question: whether to "con-
strue" a remainder interest to a single-generation class (and occasion-
ally to named individuals) to exclude a remainder beneficiary who pre-
deceases the distribution date (without regard to whether there was an
express requirement of survival) but to include that remainder benefici-
ary's children or more remote descendants who survive the distribution
date.35 Although courts usually say that answering this question in the
34. 547 N.E.2d at 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
35. In Gustafson, Judge Hancock, dissenting, sought to construe the word "chil-
dren" to mean "issue," in order to divide Leonard's half equally between Jacqueline's
and Daniel's children. "In my view," he said, "construing 'children' narrowly here and,
thereby, disinheriting the lineal descendants of one of the testator's brothers is unwar-
ranted and represents a distinct - and unfortunate - extension of the 'unmistakable in-
tent' rule." 547 N.E.2d at 1155 (Hancock, J., dissenting in part). Judge Hancock's argu-
ment was strengthened by the fact that the dispositive language used "children" and
"issue" interchangeably. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIvE TRANS-
FPRs) § 25.1 cmt. j & reporter's note 5c, at 23-24 (1987) (citing cases) (use of "chil-
dren" and "issue" interchangeably can lead to construing "children" to mean "issue");
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 285(2)(c) & cmt. j (1940); Security Trust & Safe Deposit
Co. v. Lockwood, 118 A. 225 (Del. Ch. 1922); Tucker v. Tucker, 82 S.W.2d 458 (Ky.
2318 [Vol. 94:2309
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affirmative requires an affirmative showing that the settlor used the sin-
gle-generation class-gift term in a nonliteral and expanded sense,36 there
are cases that have found such an intent on the basis of slender evi-
dence, presuming such an intent in all but name - as section 2-707
does directly.
In Cox v. Forristal,37 for example, a case containing an express re-
quirement of survival,38 the testator's will (in simplified form) 39 devised
his farm to his daughter Alice for life, and at Alice's death to his other
children (naming them). The will continued:
In the event of death of [any] of my children above named prior to
[Alice's death], the share of such child or children so dying shall descend
to, become and be the property of the then living issue of their body, and
in the event of their dying without issue, the share of such child or chil-
dren so dying shall descend to, become and be the property of my chil-
dren then living, share and share alike.40
1935); In re Estate of McKim, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (Sur. Ct. 1959); Edmundson v. Leigh,
126 S.E. 497 (N.C. 1925); Rogerson v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 222 S.E.2d
816 (W. Va. 1976). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS)
§ 25.9 cmt. d (1987) (using "children" and "issue" interchangeably can lead to con-
struing "issue" to mean "children"). Judge Hancock's argument that "children" meant
issue would have been further strengthened had the language said "children, per stir-
pes" rather than "children, share and share alike." See id. § 25.1 cmt. i, illus. 14; Trust
Co. Bank v. Heyward, 242 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 1978); In re Blodgett's Will, 294 N.Y.S.
358, 366-67 (App. Div. 1937) (construing "children... per stirpes and not per capita"
to include issue of a deceased child); In re Clark's Estate, 59 A.2d 109 (Pa. 1948); In re
Grubb's Estate, 106 A. 787 (Pa. 1919).
The dissenting judges in the earlier case of In re Welles' Will, 173 N.E.2d 876
(N.Y. 1961), had failed by one vote in their effort to avoid a result comparable to that of
Gustafson by construing "then surviving grandchildren" as including great-grandchil-
dren. The dissenters expressed grave doubt that the testator wished two of his five
branches of descendants to be excluded simply because of an unusual order of deaths.
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 25.1
cmts. g-j (1987). Cases finding such an intent are collected in Sara L. Johnson, Annota-
tion, Word "child" or "children" in will as including grandchild or grandchildren, 30
A.L.R.4th 319 (1984). Some of the cases cited in this annotation are inapposite to the
issues under discussion because the beneficiary of the future interest predeceased the
testator, making it impossible to hold that the beneficiary received a transmissible inter-
est. See, e.g., Spencer v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 132 So. 32 (Ala. 1931);
Wilson v. Rand, 110 So. 3 (Ala. 1926); In re Estate of Schedel, 15 P. 297 (Cal. 1887);
Bowker v. Bowker, 19 N.E. 213 (Mass. 1889).
37. 640 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
38. Cox and the cases cited infra note 41 provide common law support for the po-
sition, explicitly adopted in § 2-707, that a condition of survival does not indicate an in-
tent contrary to substituting descendants for deceased beneficiaries. See UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-707(b)(3) (1993). Ignoring this line of authority, Professor Dukeminier belit-
tles the UPC position on this point. See Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 153-54.
39. The actual disposition was more complicated, but in ways not relevant to the
point made in the text.
40. Cox, 640 P.2d at 881 (emphasis added).
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The testator was survived by eleven children, including Alice. Only one
of the eleven, Delilah, survived Alice. Five died during Alice's lifetime
without issue and five died during Alice's lifetime with issue (who sur-
vived Alice). The question here was whether the shares of the five who
died without issue went only to Delilah or whether it went to Delilah
and the issue of the five who predeceased Alice with issue. Construing
the alternative future interest to "my children then living" to include
the issue of the five deceased children despite the condition of sur-
vival,41 the court rejected Delilah's argument that she should get all five
shares, saying that her argument would "give[] the last to die the big-
gest shares." 42 The court cited an earlier decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court that said that "[i]f there appears to be a doubt or uncer-
tainty as to the grantor's intention in using the word 'children' there is a
reasonable presumption against disinheritance of a grandchild whose
parent is dead." 43 Had section 2-707 applied,44 it would have reached
the same result.
Another case within this alternative line of authority is Edwards v.
Bender.45 Unlike the dispositive language in Cox, the dispositive lan-
guage in Edwards did not contain an express requirement of survival.
The testator's will devised a tract of land to his daughter Nancy for life,
remainder to Nancy's "children," without an express requirement of
survival. Nancy had five children. Four of the five survived her, but one
predeceased her, leaving a child, Eula, who survived her. Rather than
apply the early vesting rule, which would have given the predeceased
41. For other cases reaching the same result despite a condition of survival, see,
for example, In re Estate of Englis, 255 A.2d 242, 244, 247 (NJ. 1969) (in order to
avoid producing an "unnatural result which we believe was never intended by the testa-
tor," court construed "then living children of any of my said five children" to include
the children's grandchildren); In re Paton, 18 N.E. 625 (N.Y. 1888); Pfender v. Depew,
121 N.Y.S. 285 (App. Div. 1910); In re Meyn's Will, 81 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sur. Ct. 1948);
In re Stecher's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sur. Ct. 1947); In re Clark's Estate, 59 A.2d 109
(Pa. 1948); Douglas v. James, 28 A. 319 (Vt. 1893); Rogerson v. Wheeling Dollar Say.
& Trust Co., 222 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1976); Security Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim,
158 S.E.2d 715 (W. Va. 1968). In the preceding cases, one or more but not all of the
remainder beneficiaries predeceased the distribution date. The same result has been
reached where all of the remainder beneficiaries predeceased the distribution date. See,
e.g., In re Craig's Estate, 148 P.2d 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Hodge v. Lovell's
Trustee, 90 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1936); In re Court's Estate, 91 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sur. Ct.
1949); In re Harrison's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sur. Ct. 1947).
42. Cox, 640 P.2d at 884.
43. In re Works' Estate, 213 P.2d 998, 1001 (Kan. 1950) (quoting Bennett v.
Humphreys, 155 P.2d 431, 432 (Kan. 1945)), cited in Cox, 640 P.2d at 884-85.
44. Although § 2-707 would not have applied to the devise in Cox because it was
not in trust, the devise illustrates the type of provisions often found in poorly drafted
trusts.
45. 25 So. 1010 (Ala. 1899).
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child a transmissible future interest, the court held that the word "chil-
dren" "may be extended to include grandchildren, when such intent ap-
pears from the whole instrument, or where otherwise the devise would
fail." Although the devise would not otherwise fail (because four of
Nancy's five children survived her), the court found it "evident" that
the testator's intention, "though not expressly stated," was that "the is-
sue of such of her children as might die before [the life tenant] should
take the share which such deceased child would have taken." 47 Were
section 2-707 applicable,48 it would have reached the same result.
In effect, the Cox-Edwards line of authority, like section 2-707,
presumptively converts a remainder to a single-generation class into a
multiple-generation class gift with a survival requirement.
C. Momentum for a Statute like Section 2-707
Momentum has long been building for a statute like section 2-707.
Transmissible future interests, which result from the constructional pref-
erence for early vesting, have been embattled in the scholarly literature
for decades. Although the original basis for the rule of early vesting is
obscure,49 the desire to avoid the now-defunct rule of destructibility of
46. 25 So. at 1012. For other cases in which the court, rather than giving the de-
ceased beneficiary a transmissible future interest, construed the word "children" to in-
clude issue of deceased children, see, for example, Works, 213 P.2d at 1001; Haas v.
Canton of Bern, 54 A.2d 213 (NJ. Ch. 1947); Farmers' Trust Co. v. Borden, 89 A. 985
(N.J. Ch. 1914); In re Estate of McNeil, 238 N.Y.S.2d 389 (App. Div. 1963); In re
Blodgett's Will, 294 N.Y.S. 358 (App. Div. 1937); In re Niegsch's Will, 294 N.Y.S.2d
583 (Sur. Ct. 1968); In re Wait's Estate, 42 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (Sur. Ct. 1943) ("Where
the will fails to denote whether grandchildren were intended to be included in the term
'children', the presumption that the designation was used in its primary sense should
bow to the presumption against disinheritance.... No grandchild is here otherwise pro-
vided for, the clause in dispute disposes of the entire estate, and the will discloses no
apparent intention to exclude the issue of a deceased child from among those who are to
share in his estate. The Court accordingly determines that the term 'children' as em-
ployed herein includes the grandchild of decedent." (citation omitted)); In re Davis'
Estate, 214 N.Y.S. 142 (Sur. Ct. 1925); In re Albertson's Estate, 198 A. 152 (Pa. 1938)
("children" and "issue" used interchangeably, but court relied on other factors); In re
Campbell's Estate, 51 A. 1099 (Pa. 1902); David v. Mitchell, 178 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1943); Davis Trust Co. v. Elkins, 175 S.E. 611, 614 (W. Va. 1934) ("[I]t is an
accepted rule of construction in the interpretation of wills that a presumption exists
against the testator's disinheriting direct descendants .... "). See also cases cited infra
note 118.
47. Edwards, 25 So. at 1012. The court based this conclusion on the fact that the
will contained a gift over in case Nancy died without issue. Nancy, of course, did not
die without issue; she was survived by four of her five children.
48. Although § 2-707 would not have applied to the devise in Edwards because it
was not in trust, the devise illustrates the type of provisions often found in poorly
drafted trusts.
49. See Rabin, supra note 15, at 480 n.87.
2321June 1996]
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2321 1995-1996
Michigan Law Review
contingent remainders50 certainly played a large part,5 as did the once
overly harsh but now widely liberalized rule against perpetuities.5 2 Like
so many rules in this area, the original basis for the rule has disap-
peared, but the rule itself persists. As previously noted, estate planners
have long been cautioned, and capable estate planners have long under-
stood, that they should not create transmissible future interests. Trans-
missible future interests can cause unnecessary estate taxes, can in-
crease administrative and tracing costs, and can allow the property to be
diverted outside the family or bloodline.5 3
In a masterful article published in 1951, Daniel Schuyler, a law
professor and a practicing estate-planning attorney of the first rank,
wrote: "Sometimes the rule of early vesting has the effect of defeating
what any sensible person would assume to be the intention of a testa-
tor.' ' 54 Professor Rabin explained why: "[Passing] property to a dead
person's estate .... is undesirable because it raises the possibility that
persons whom the testator had no intention of benefiting will become
50. In most states, the destructibility rule is abolished by statute. See SIMES &
SMrrt. supra note 25, § 207. Even where not abolished by statute, the destructibility
rule would probably not be recognized today. See Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 600
P.2d 278 (N.M. 1979) (refusing to apply the destructibility rule); REsTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 240 (1936) (propounding "antidestructibility rule").
51. See RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 243 cmt. i (1940); Schuyler, supra note 14,
at 408-18.
52. The Uniform Probate Code contains the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities, which adopts the wait-and-see-plus-deferred-reformation method of
perpetuity reform. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-901 to 2-906 (1993).
53. On unnecessary death taxation, see, for example, I.R.C. § 2033 (1994); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2033-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1965); Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(a) (as amended
in 1963); Rev. Rul. 76-472, 1976-2 C.B. 264, 264 ("[F]uture interests in property that a
decedent owns at death are taxed just as possessory interests. Thus, the value of a
vested remainder interest is includible in the value of the remainderman's gross estate
under section 2033 of the Code even though the remainderman dies before obtaining
possession of the property."); see also Coddington v. Stone, 9 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1940)
(concluding that testator's son had a transmissible future interest, which passed by intes-
tacy on the son's death prior to the distribution date, thus subjecting the property to
state inheritance taxes and to federal estate taxes). On difficulties of tracing transmissi-
ble future interests that have been omitted from inventories and decrees, see, for exam-
ple, In re Latimer's Will, 63 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Wis. 1954). On potential diversion of the
property outside the family or bloodline, see infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
54. Schuyler, supra note 14, at 427. Schuyler added:
[T]here are instances when the rule of early vesting positively defeats intention
- by casting property to strangers, by making property available to creditors,
and by subjecting it to successive death taxes. A careful balancing of the reasons
for and against the rule of early vesting indicates that social changes have robbed
it of its once great virility. Its repudiation could well be followed by the adoption
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his de facto beneficiaries. '55 Examples abound. One is Peadro v.
Peadro,5 6 where "[t]he effect [of allowing the future interest to be trans-
missible] was to invest the second wife of the husband of a niece of the
testator - a person wholly unrelated to the testator even by marriage
- with an undisclosed portion of the fee."' 57 Another is De Korwin v.
First National Bank,58 where "the [transmissible future interest ended
up in the hands of] the second wife of a son-in-law of the testator -
again an utter stranger." 59 Judicial recognition of the fact that "[e]arly
vesting frequently frustrates intentions by casting property to strangers"
led the Illinois court to rule that "early vesting of remainders should no
longer be followed in this State without question." 6
There is another side to the issue, however. Although a transmissi-
ble future interest might end up in the hands of someone outside the
family or bloodline, it might not. In modem times, scholars have argued
that this possibility is the only reason for retaining the rule. Rabin wrote
that the principal advantage of the rule of early vesting is that it "tends
to prevent unintended disinheritance of the issue of a deceased remain-
derman... . [Today this is the rule's principal raison d'etre and no
doubt explains why the preference for vesting is particularly strong
where the remainderman is a descendant of the testator.' ' 61 The Restate-
ment (Second) of Property recently stated that the only modem justifica-
tion for the rule of early vesting is "that it enables the deceased class
member to pass his share to his issue, thereby keeping the benefits of
the gift equal among the descendant lines." 62 This is what I call the
55. Rabin, supra note 15, at 479.
56. 81 N.E.2d 192 (11. 1948).
57. Schuyler, supra note 14, at 428.
58. 179 F2d 347 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982 (1950).
59. Schuyler, supra note 14, at 429.
60. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Beach, 513 N.E.2d 833, 838-39 (Il. 1983). Al-
though the Restatement of Property included constructional preferences for early vesting
and for early indefeasibility, see RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 243 cmts. i-j (1940), both
constructional preferences were dropped from the newer Restatement (Third) of
Property (Donative Transfers). See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE
TRANSFERS) § 11.3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995). This was approved by the American
Law Institute at the 1995 Annual Meeting. 72 A.L.I. PRoc. 65 (1996).
61. Rabin, supra note 15, at 483-84.
62. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATvE TRANSFERs) § 27.3 cmt. a
(1987). Comment e also notes that
The substitution of the issue of a class member who dies after the dispositive in-
strument takes effect and before such class member's share is distributable will
cause the various lineal lines to be treated equally. This equal treatment of lineal
lines can be accomplished by the deceased class member's will if there is no sub-
stitute gift to issue. The substitute gift to issue route, however, avoids passing the
gift to the deceased class member's issue through the deceased class member's
estate. Because of the undesirability of having the gift pass through the deceased
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"trickle-down theory," which is that the future interest might trickle
down through the deceased remainder beneficiary's estate and, when the
trust is dissolved at some later time, the property itself might end up in
the hands of his or her descendants. Of course, as noted above, it might
not. Indeed, the remainder beneficiary might die without issue. The re-
mainder beneficiary might die intestate, in which case there might be
multiple heirs, one or more of whom also predecease the distribution
date. The property can easily end up in the hands of complete strangers.
Consequently, the trickle-down theory is a hit-or-miss mechanism
for protecting the predeceased remainder beneficiary's descendants from
disinheritance. A more direct and efficient means of protecting these de-
scendants is by legislation extending antilapse-type protection to future
interests. Long before section 2-707 was promulgated, commentators
had favored such a statute. Rabin wrote:
It might well be preferable to protect the issue of deceased remain-
derman by legislation, rather than by the rule favoring vesting. An
amendment to the anti-lapse statutes to protect the issue of persons who
died after the decedent would eliminate the need for strained attempts to
avoid implied requirements of survival.6
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Property stated that "it would be
a better overall result to [substitute a class member's surviving descend-
ants] for the deceased class member and avoid involvement of the class
member's share in his or her estate." 64
This is what section 2-707 does. It establishes a rule of construc-
tion, which yields if there is a finding of a contrary intention,65 that sub-
stitutes a remainder beneficiary's descendants who survive the distribu-
tion date for a remainder beneficiary who predeceases the distribution
date.66 As recommended in the Restatement (Second),67 in the literature,
member's estate and because the provision for substitution of issue is a sufficient
indication of the donor's intent that he did not wish such a result, it should be
presumed, in the absence of contrary indication, that the donor who provides for
substitution of issue intends that the share of the other class members be enlarged
if a class member fails to survive to the date of distribution and leaves no issue
who so survive.
Id. § 27.3 cmt. e (citation omitted).
63. Rabin, supra note 15, at 487.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIvE TRANSFERS) § 27.3 cmt. b
(1987). The Restatement, written before UPC § 2-707 was promulgated, also noted with
approval the non-UPC statutory law in a few states that substitutes descendants of pre-
deceased remainder beneficiaries and added that "[t]he policy of these statutes com-
mends itself to decisional law." Id. § 27.3 cmt i; see also Halbach, Issues About Issue,
supra note 14, at 367 n.142 (describing this statutory law with approval).
65. See Utqi. PROB. CODE § 2-701 (1993).
66. See UNFw. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b)(l)-(2) (1993).
67. See supra note 64.
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and by analogy to the well-drafted trust, descendants were chosen as the
appropriate substitute takers.68 To prevent the statute from being intent-
defeating, the substitution of descendants only applies if the trust docu-
ment fails to create an alternative future interest that is entitled to take
effect in possession or enjoyment.
69
IU. DUKEMINIER DISSENTS, SUPPORTING TRANSMISSIBLE FUTURE
INTERESTS
Revised Article II has naturally sparked a flurry of law review arti-
cles by legal academics. It was the subject of a conference in 1992 at
the Albany Law School. The conference was followed by publication of
a symposium issue of the Albany Law Review collecting articles by the
participants and some nonparticipants. 70 The symposium articles were
both constructive and valuable. In our introduction to the symposium is-
sue, John Langbein and I wrote:
We are particularly impressed and gratified that there is no serious
disagreement in these many scholarly articles with the grand themes of
the new UPC article II. It is hard to find a trace of dissent in the sympo-
sium papers concerning the major policy premises of the legislation -
unifying the law of probate and nonprobate transfers, overcoming intent-
defeating formalities, and achieving greater equity in spousal property re-
lations. Our symposium authors do, however, remind us that in translat-
ing large policy concepts into highly specific legislative prescriptions, a
host of detailed choices arise, and these choices entail important practical
consequences. Many of these choices are close substitutes; there are
often good arguments for each. We have tried in this paper, as in the
drafting of UPC article II itself, to explain the choices that were made,
while conceding that complete consensus on matters of statutory detail
cannot be achieved. We take away from this valuable symposium a deep
sense of satisfaction that the new UPC article II has attracted so much
support from a group of specialist authors whose job is to be critical and
probing. We reiterate that the task of revision is never ending, and that as
experience shows the need for reforming the reforms, scholars and prac-
68. See also sources cited supra note 8 (describing the long-standing construc-
tional preference for not disinheriting a line of descent). Substituting descendants is also
the most conservative set of substitute takers. Although some settlors might agree with
substituting a broader set of substitute takers, nearly all settlors would agree with substi-
tuting the remainder beneficiary's descendants. See also infra text accompanying note
133 (describing preference of leading practitioners for substituting descendants); infra
note 136 and accompanying text (same).
69. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b)(4) (1993). See supra note 17 and infra note
89 for illustrations of this feature of the Code.
70. Symposium on the Uniform Probate Code: Reflections on Recent Revisions, 55
ALB. L. REV. 869 (1992).
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titioners will find a warm welcome when they bring needed repairs to the
attention of the [Joint Editorial Board].7
Some of the ideas in the symposium articles found their way into the
1993 technical amendments to the Code.
72
None of the articles in the symposium and only a few articles
outside the symposium have disagreed with the objectives of the UPC
revisions. In The Uniform Probate Code Upends the Law of Remain-
ders,73 however, Jesse Dukeminier, professor emeritus at the UCLA
School of Law, writes in opposition to the objectives of UPC section 2-
707 because it presumptively does away with transmissible future inter-
ests in trust. As noted in Part I, the thrust of section 2-707 is to make
sure that no descending line having a living member on the distribution
date is disinherited, and that no share is sent down a line that has died
out by the distribution date. In Upending Remainders, Professor
Dukeminier, without mentioning any of the authorities discussed in Part
I reproving transmissible future interests and supporting a legislative re-
sponse like section 2-707,74 describes this idea variously as "revolution-
ary," 75 based "purely on [the drafters'] own speculation, '76 bereft of
empirical evidence showing "that the common law has read people
wrong for centuries, ' 77 "retrogressive, ' 78 and "a piece of feudalism
71. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratui-
tous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REv. 871, 890 (1992).
72. For example, the article by Professor Ira Mark Bloom led to a revision of § 2-
209(a). See Ira Mark Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the
Surviving Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and
Suggestions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 941, 975-77 (1992). The article by Professor Sheldon F.
Kurtz led to the addition of § 2-707(e). See Sheldon F. Kurtz, Powers of Appointment
Under the 1990 Uniform Probate Code: What Was Done - What Remains To Be Done,
55 ALB. L. REv. 1151, 1199-1201 (1992).
73. Dukeminier, supra note 4.
74. See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text. Dukeminier does acknowledge
that "a number of academic commentators opposed the common law presumption of
vesting," but attributes this only to "the potential estate taxation of a remainder at a re-
mainderman's death," a disadvantage that he says "was neutralized, however, with the
enactment of the federal generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax in 1986." Dukeminier,
supra note 4, at 162-63 (discussing I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (1994)). Dukeminier does not
mention that these commentators were mainly concerned with the possibility of the
property passing outside of the family or bloodline.
75. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 150.
76. Id.
77. Id. Dukeminier is not always impressed by statistical evidence. In an earlier
article attacking another uniform act (the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
or USRAP), Dukeminier labeled the 90-year wait-and-see perpetuities period as a
"clone" of the "dozen-healthy-babies" ploy, a device that is unused in actual practice.
See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1023, 1031, 1034-36 (1987). I replied, demonstrating that the
"dozen-healthy-babies ploy" would, statistically, produce a period of 113 years. See
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redivivus. ' '79 Dukeminier says that "the only advantage of section 2-
707 is that it eliminates remainders from remaindermen's probate es-
tates, possibly saving probate costs."80 Then he adds that "[i]f there are
probate administration costs associated with remainders, which have
never been documented, they are a small price to pay for the flexibility
of the common law."81
A. Dukeminier's Case for Transmissible Future Interests and What's
Wrong with It
Professor Dukeminier builds his case against section 2-707 on two
main pillars: a defense of transmissible future interests, which in turn
rests on what he calls the "flexibility of the common law," and his por-
trayal of the well-drafted trust. He also charges that section 2-707 is in-
consistent with the modem trend toward increasing spousal protection
and is not supported by empirical evidence.
1. The "Flexibility" of Transmissible Future Interests?
Professor Dukeminier argues that transmissible future interests
have much-desired benefits, all of which are "upended" by section 2-
707. Dukeminier uses an "income to A for life, remainder to B" trust to
illustrate these benefits.12 Although we shall see that even this example
provides little real basis for his position, it is important to note that a
simplistic income-to-A-for-life, remainder-to-B trust, while occasionally
useful in law school casebooks and classroom presentations, is seldom
seen in real-world practice, and consequently is not the focus of section
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The Ratio-
nale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 157, 160-62 (1988).
Dukeminier never challenged the statistical evidence, but his casebook describes the 90-
year period as "a close approximation of the 'dozen or so healthy babies chosen from
families noted for longevity.'" JESSE DUKEmImR & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 887 (5th ed. 1995).
Dukeminier has labeled the USRAP as "an extraordinarily risky venture," "so bi-
zarre that the mind boggles," "Waggoner's phantom ship," an idea that gives a "bi-
zarre turn to perpetuities reform," and an act that is "deserving of oblivion."
Dukeminier, supra, at 1024, 1025, 1068, 1069, 1079. USRAP has now been enacted in
24 states. Dukeminier's casebook mainly attributes USRAP's success to "a smooth sell-
ing job by the Uniform group." DuKEMiNmR & JOHANSON, supra, at 888.
78. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 150.
79. Id. at 166.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. But see supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text on the costs of the
"flexibility of the common law."
82. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 150-52.
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2-707. In the real world, cases like Krooss,83 Bomberger,4 Lawson,85
Gustafson,8 6 and Cox87 demonstrate that future interests to which section
2-707 would apply arise in much more complicated trusts, and are usu-
ally contingent on multiple events, such as the life tenant and perhaps
other remainder beneficiaries dying without issue. Nevertheless, for pur-
poses of examining Dukeminier's avowed benefits of transmissible fu-
ture interests, I will use his simplistic example. In that example, the
common law would hold that B has a transmissible future interest. If B
dies before A, B's future interest would pass through B's probate estate
to his or her successors in interest - B's heirs or devisees. When A
subsequently dies, the future interest that B's successors in interest pre-
viously received from B would become possessory.88
Section 2-707 would change that. Section 2-707 avoids tracing fu-
ture interests through the probate estates of deceased persons. At A's
death, the corpus always passes directly to living persons - to B if still
living; if not, to B's then-living descendants;8 9 if none, either to the per-
sons who would be the donor's heirs if the donor died when A died or
to the donor's then-living residuary devisees and the then-living de-
scendants of residuary devisees who had predeceased A.
The crux of Dukeminier's case against section 2-707 is that it de-
prives B of the "flexibility" to "deal with changes in his family cir-
cumstances during the life tenant's life." 9 Dukeminier's claim is worth
83. In re Krooss, 199 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1951).
84. In re Bomberger's Estate, 32 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1943).
85. Lawson v. Lawson, 148 S.E.2d 546 (N.C. 1966).
86. In re Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 1989).
87. Cox v. Forristall, 640 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
88. This assumes that all of B's successors in interest outlive A. If one or more of
them die between B's death and A's death, the remainder interest must be traced through
their estates to find out who owns the remainder interest, and in what proportions, at the
distribution date. The possibility that some will die in the meantime is not imaginary.
See, e.g., De Korwin v. First Nat]. Bank, 179 F2d 347 (7th Cir.), revg. on other
grounds, 84 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982 (1950); Peadro v.
Peadro, 81 N.E.2d 192 (Ill. 1948); Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d at 1153.
89. Had the trust created a gift over, the gift over would take precedence over the
substitute gift to B's descendants. For example, had the trust provided for the income to
go to A for life, remainder to B if B survives A, but if not to C, then if B predeceased A
leaving descendants who survived A, and if C also survived A, the corpus would go to
C, not to B's descendants. To take it a step further, if C also predeceased A, leaving de-
scendants who survived A, the corpus would go to B's descendants, not to C's descend-
ants. Finally, if B or C (but not both) left descendants who survived A, the corpus
would go to those descendants. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 (1993); Halbach &
Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1131-47; supra note 17.
90. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 150, 166. Dukeminier cites a 1969 article of
mine that said pretty much the same thing. Id. at 151 n.9 (citing Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Future Interests Legislation: Implied Conditions of Survivorship and Substi-
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repeating: Section 2-707, he says, deprives B of the "flexibility" to
"deal with changes in his family circumstances during the life tenant's
life"! Were it not for section 2-707, Dukeminier states that B could
"devise the remainder to B's spouse, taking advantage of the estate tax
marital deduction, and making it possible for the spouse to use her
$600,000 exemption from the federal estate tax and $1 million exemp-
tion from the generation-skipping transfer tax in transferring the trust
property to their children." 91 Not noted by Dukeminier is the fact that
under section 2-707, the property would not be taxable in either the
predeceased remainder beneficiary's estate or in the beneficiary's sur-
viving spouse's estate to begin with, hence freeing up other property
that would be taxable in their estates for the marital deduction and the
$600,000 estate tax and the $1 million generation-skipping transfer tax
exemptions.
Never mind. Dukeminier continues: B could "devise the remainder
to B's children in such shares and on such terms as appear wise."
'92
Moreover, if B's children are minors, B could "devise the remainder in
trust for the children until they reach majority, avoiding conservator-
ship." 93 Finally, if one of B's children is disabled, B could "devise the
child's share in a trust providing the child only with benefits supple-
menting those the state provides, thus avoiding the state's seizure of the
child's full share as the child's creditor, as section 2-707 would al-
low."'94 Had the settlor been better advised, he or she would have given
B this flexibility by means of a power of appointment, but failing that,
"[t]he transmissible vested remainder rule of the common law is a sub-
stitute for a power of appointment overlooked by the settlor."95
There is much that is wrong with Dukeminier's claim that section
2-707 deprives the remainder beneficiary, B, of the "flexibility" to
"deal with changes in his family circumstances during the life tenant's
life.' ' 96 First and foremost, the predeceased beneficiary of a transmissi-
ble future interest can only transmit a future interest, not a present inter-
est. The recipient cannot derive much pleasure from a future interest
until it ripens into possession. The recipient cannot use it for investment
or consumption. The recipient cannot even hang it on the wall or place
tutionary Gifts Under the New Illinois "Anti-Lapse" Provision, 1969 U. ILL L. F. 423,
438). Obviously I have changed my mind in the quarter century since I wrote that early-
career article.




95. Id. at 150-51.
96. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
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it on the coffee table and admire its beauty. A future interest is of mini-
mal financial (or aesthetic) value until the distribution date, i.e., until
the trust is dissolved and the corpus is actually distributed.
Of course, the future interest does become valuable when the trust
is dissolved and the corpus is actually distributed. But the remainder
beneficiary cannot adjust for changes in his or her family circumstances
that have occurred by that time. The remainder beneficiary can only
take into account changes in family circumstances up to his or her own
death. Only the life tenant can take into account changes in family cir-
cumstances occurring after the remainder beneficiary's death but before
the distribution date. This explains why capable estate planners wanting
to build flexibility into a trust give a power of appointment to the life
tenant, not to the remainder beneficiary. 97 When the remainder benefici-
ary dies, no one can predict when the distribution date will occur. Some
life tenants die young, while others enjoy great longevity. The time be-
tween the remainder beneficiary's death and the distribution date might
be considerable 98 or brief.99 Much can happen during the interim. Sig-
nificant changes can occur in the remainder beneficiary's family cir-
cumstances: By the time the distribution date comes about, the remain-
der beneficiary's surviving spouse might have remarried or died, the
disabled child might have died or the laws dealing with supplementary
trusts for disabled children might have changed, a healthy child might
have become disabled or died, or a minor child might have reached
adulthood or died. Indeed, the deceased remainder beneficiary might die
unmarried and without issue and might even die long before reaching
adulthood.'00
Moreover, remainder beneficiaries are typically at least one gener-
ation younger than the life tenant. If that younger-generation remainder
beneficiary writes a will - many die intestate'0' - he or she is not
likely even to consider the possibility of predeceasing the distribution
date when writing that will. In addition, unlike Dukeminier's simplistic
income-to-A-for-life, remainder-to-B example, most future interests to
which section 2-707 would apply are, like the ones in Krooss,1°2
97. See supra Part I.A; infra note 126 and accompanying text.
98. In Aufenkamp v. First Ky. Trust Co., 705 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), the
gap was 41 years for one remainder beneficiary and 32 years for the other remainder
beneficiary. The gap was 20 years in Saulsberry v. Second Natl. Bank, 400 S.W.2d 506
(Ky. 1966), and 11 years in Wade v. Bragg, 86 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1956).
99. In Culver v. Culver, 425 A.2d 222 (Md. Ct. App. 1981), the gap was one year.
100. In Gist v. Brown, 113 S.E.2d 75 (S.C. 1960), the deceased remainder benefi-
ciary who had a transmissible future interest died at age four.
101. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
102. In re Krooss, 99 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1951).
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Bomberger,10 3 Lawson,1°4 Gustafson,105 and Cox,106 contingent on some
event unrelated to survival (such as the life tenant and possibly other re-
mainder beneficiaries dying without issue). The beneficiary might think
that the chance of receiving any of the corpus is pretty remote. In
Bomberger, for example, one of the remainder beneficiaries, John, died
not only before the life tenant but also before his mother.'07 His remain-
der interest was contingent on the life tenant dying without issue and on
his mother predeceasing the life tenant. When John died, he might have
expected the life tenant to die without issue, but he had no way of
knowing that his mother would later predecease the life tenant. Moreo-
ver, the beneficiary might not understand that he or she "owns" a
transmissible future interest at all. Even if the remainder beneficiary's
attorney examines the trust document and recognizes that his or her cli-
ent does or might "own" one, 08 not much estate or tax planning can be
done with an uncertain interest of uncertain value.
Whether the remainder interest is contingent or vested, the bottom
line is that there is not much that the remainder beneficiary can do dur-
ing the life tenant's life with a transmissible future interest to "deal with
changes in his family circumstances," circumstances that might change
in unpredictable ways between the beneficiary's death and the distribu-
tion date. Dukeminier cites no evidence, and my research of the case
law uncovered none, that beneficiaries of transmissible future interests
do any of the things that Dukeminier's article suggests. In the actual
cases, the court either does not bother to disclose what happened to the
transmissible remainder'09 or does disclose that it passed through the
beneficiary's estate by default, not by design - either because the re-
mainder beneficiary died intestate" 0 or because the remainder benefici-
ary's will made no mention of the remainder interest and thus passed it,
103. In re Bomberger's Estate, 32 A.2d 729 (Pa. 1943).
104. Lawson v. Lawson, 148 S.E.2d 546 (N.C. 1966).
105. In re Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 1989).
106. Cox v. Forristall, 640 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
107. Bomberger, 32 A.2d at 730.
108. Transmissible future interests are often omitted from the inventories and de-
crees of the remainder beneficiary's estate, leading to tracing costs. See, e.g., In re
Latimer's Will, 63 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Wis. 1954).
109. See, e.g., Bomberger, 32 A.2d at 730-31.
110. The remainder beneficiary or beneficiaries died intestate in, for example, De
Korwin v. First Natl. Bank, 179 F.2d 347 (7th Cir.), revg. on other grounds, 84 F. Supp.
918, 923 (N.D. Ill. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982 (1950); Peadro v. Peadro, 81
N.E.2d 192, 193 (Ill. 1948); Saulsberry v. Second Natl. Bank, 400 S.W.2d 506, 507 (Ky.
1966); Detroit Bank & Trust Co. v. Grout, 289 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. Ct. App.) (revocable
trust), appeal denied, 409 Mich. 894 (1980); Boone County Natl. Bank v. Edson, 760
S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1988); Dilts v. Clayhaunce, 62 A. 672 (N.J. Ch. 1906); Coddington v.
Stone, 9 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1940); Gist v. Brown, 113 S.E.2d 75 (S.C. 1960).
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apparently unwittingly, under the will's catch-all clause, the residuary
clause."' Dukeminier cites no case, and I have found none, in which
the remainder beneficiary singled out the remainder interest, deliber-
ately passing it in or adding it to a marital deduction trust for his or her
surviving spouse or a supplementary trust for a disabled child. 1 2 Small
wonder that - like section 2-707 - well-drafted trusts do not grant re-
mainder beneficiaries the "flexibility" "to deal with changes in [their]
family circumstances during the life tenant's life."
Dukeminier's disapproval of section 2-707 comes in sharp and
mystifying contrast to his approval of a case that applied antilapse pro-
tection to an income interest in a trust. The case is Dewire v. Haveles,"3
a case reproduced in his casebook." 4 Thomas Dewire devised the resi-
due of his estate in trust that was to terminate 21 years after the death
of his last living grandchild. Upon termination, the corpus was to be
distributed to "the lineal descendants of my grandchildren." '" 5 During
the trust, the income was to be paid to the testator's widow for life, then
to his son, Thomas, Jr. Thereafter, the income was to be "divided
equally amongst [the testator's] grandchildren.""16 Nine years after
Thomas, Jr.'s death, one of six grandchildren, Thomas III, died, sur-
vived by his widow and daughter, Jennifer. The other five grandchil-
dren, the other income beneficiaries, were still living.
The question was what to do with the one-sixth share of income
previously payable to Thomas IL. "[T]he reasonable inference as to the
testator's intention," the court concluded, "is that Jennifer should take
her father's share in the income."" 7 Relying on the policy of the
Massachusetts antilapse statute, the court fashioned a rule of construc-
tion requiring "(absent a contrary intent), the substitution of a class
member's surviving issue for a deceased class member.""' 8 Although
111. The remainder beneficiary died with a will, but the transmissible remainder
interest passed by default under the residuary clause, in for example, Boone County,
760 S.W.2d at 110; In re Krooss, 99 N.E.2d 222, 224 & n.1 (N.Y. 1951), discussed in
supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text; Elliott v. Griffin, 237 S.E.2d 396 (Va. 1977).
112. An occasional case is found in which the remainder beneficiary deeded the
remainder interest to another or others. See, e.g., In re Clayton's Estate, 74 A.2d 1, 2
(Md. 1950); Davis v. Davis, 165 S.E.2d 553, 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
113. 534 N.E.2d 782 (Mass. 1989).
114. See DUKEM NiER & JOHANSON, supra note 77, at 812.
115. Dewire, 534 N.E.2d at 784 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. 534 N.E.2d at 784 (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. 534 N.E.2d at 784.
118. 534 N.E.2d at 785 n.5. Dewire is not the first case to reach such a result. For
other cases in which the court construed a single-generation class gift of income to in-
clude the descendants of a deceased class member, see, for example, Cooper v.
Birmingham Trust & Say. Co., 28 So. 2d 720 (Ala. 1947); Ryan v. Herbert, 47 A.2d
360 (Md. 1946); In re Estate of Carnegie, 155 A.2d 349 (Pa. 1959).
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the court assumed that each grandchild's right to the income was only
"a life interest,"" 9 the trust document apparently did not limit it to the
life of each grandchild, and in such circumstances, there is a respectable
position that the grandchild's income interest does not terminate on
death but is for the entire term of the trust.120 Adopting this position
would have allowed Thomas III to transmit his share of the income for
the remaining period of the trust. Unlike a future interest, which is of
minimal financial benefit to the recipient until the distribution date, an
income interest is of considerable immediate benefit. All the tax and
family planning that Dukeminier inappropriately attributes to transmis-
sible future interests look more sensible when applied to transmissible
income interests. One would expect Dukeminier to take the court to task
for depriving Thomas III of the opportunity of deciding how best to
provide for his own family - including the opportunity to benefit his
surviving widow rather than his daughter - and for acting without em-
pirical evidence. Not so. His Teacher's Manual states that "the result
[of Dewire] makes good sense."'
2'
2. Powers of Appointment in Well-Drafted Trusts
In a section titled "What a Skilled Estate Planner Would Do,"
122
Professor Dukeminier follows up on his point that "[t]he transmissible
vested remainder rule of the common law is a substitute for a power of
appointment overlooked by the settlor"' 3 by portraying good estate
planning in a way that will bemuse my friends and colleagues who
practice in this area, including the leading practitioners who serve on
the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code. 24 The follow-
ing example is what Dukeminier says is a skilled work product:
Dukeminier's "Well-Drafted" Trust Case: T devises a fund in trust
"for A for life, then to B if B survives A, and if B does not survive A,
then to such one or more of B's spouse and B's descendants and their
119. Dewire, 534 N.E.2d at 784; accord RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 115 (1936).
120. See Olin L. Browder, Trusts and the Doctrine of Estates, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1507, 1559 (1974).
121. JESSE DUKEM]NIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 217 (5th ed. 1995). THE RESULT OF Dewire is consistent with UPC
§ 2-707. In fact, § 2-707 would apply directly if each income payment is treated as a
separate postponed class gift, as provided in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
(DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 26.2 cmt. g (1987). That approach would allow the substitute
class to continue to rotate, so that on the death of the first substitute taker the income
would be paid to his or her then-living descendants, and so on until the trust terminates.
122. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 163-65.
123. Id. at 150-51.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39 for a description of their
credentials.
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spouses as B appoints by will. If B fails to exercise the power of appoint-
ment, the trust property shall be distributed on A's death to B's descend-
ants then living for over to others]."' 15
Dukeminier's "well-drafted" trust case is a remarkable mischaracteriza-
tion of good estate planning. Standard practice gives the power of ap-
pointment to the life tenant, not the remainder beneficiary. 126 A capable
estate planner, wishing to insert flexibility into a trust, never uses trans-
missible future interests and seldom thinks of giving a power of ap-
pointment to a remainder beneficiary, much less conditioning that
power on the remainder beneficiary predeceasing the distribution
date.
127
There is something odd about Dukeminier's argument. Dukeminier
appears to promote special powers for the remainder beneficiary rather
than for the life tenant only when attacking UPC section 2-707.128
Dukeminier's casebook has a chapter entitled "Building Flexibility into
125. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 164.
126. See supra text accompanying note 97. In estate planning texts, it is usually
assumed that the power of appointment will be given to the life tenant. The possibility
of giving special testamentary powers to the remainder beneficiaries as a substitute for
transmissible future interests is never given even passing consideration. See, e.g., JOHN
R. PRICa, PRICE ON CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 10.23 (1992) (stating that
"[w]here it is consistent with the client's plan, a current beneficiary of the trust may be
given a special power of appointment" and not mentioning the possibility of giving
such a power to the remainder beneficiary) (emphasis added). Similarly, a recent article
by two practicing lawyers argues for building flexibility into trusts by, among other
things, giving a special power of appointment to the life tenant. They never even con-
sider the possibility of giving powers to the remainder beneficiaries. See Neill G.
McBryde & Frederick R. Keydel, Building Flexibility in Estate Planning Documents,
TR. & EST., Jan. 1996, at 56, 60.
In a footnote, Dukeminier treats the standard as exceptional and the exceptional as
standard, by stating that a skilled estate planner "might" give the life tenant rather than
the remainder beneficiary a power, but, he says, only if the life tenant "is competent
and has sound judgment." Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 164 n.50 (emphasis added).
127. In Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 150 n.8, Professor Dukeminier cites an arti-
cle by Professor Halbach in a way that leaves the impression that Halbach supports
building flexibility into trusts by giving powers of appointment to remainder benefi-
ciaries. Read in context, however, the Halbach article clearly supports giving the power
to the life tenant. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Use of Powers of Appointment in Es-
tate Planning, 45 IowA L. REv. 691, 692-93 (1960).
The only secondary authorities I found that suggest giving a power to remainder
beneficiaries who predecease the distribution date are W. BARTON LEACH & JAMES K.
LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FuTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 329 (1961);
Vemer F. Chaffin, Descendible Future Interests in Georgia: The Effect of the Preference
for Early Vesting, 7 GA. L. REV. 443, 444-45, 490-91 (1973).
128. The only place in Dukeminier's casebook in which a remainder beneficiary is
given a power of appointment is in a note declaring that "[iJf you want to give the re-
mainderman power to transmit the future interest at death, give him a remainder contin-
gent upon surviving plus a special power of appointment." DUKEMiNIER & JOHANSON,
supra note 77, at 761 (first emphasis added). The only place in the casebook in which it
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Trusts: Powers of Appointment."'' 29 If conferring a special power on
each remainder beneficiary who predeceases the distribution date is
what a skilled estate planner would do, one would expect his casebook
chapter on powers to present that approach as a model of good estate
planning. It does not. None of the illustrations in his casebook chapter
on powers gives the remainder beneficiary a special power of appoint-
ment. Nowhere does that chapter promote the idea of giving the remain-
der beneficiary a special power in order to allow that beneficiary to ad-
just to changed family conditions. The power - hence the ability to
adjust to changed family conditions - is always given to the life
tenant.
But, we need not rely only on Dukeminier's chapter on powers of
appointment to disprove his argument. If it were true that clients were
clamoring for trusts giving powers of appointment to remainder benefi-
ciaries who predecease the distribution date rather than to life tenants,
one would expect the form books to be full of such forms. They are
not. I am unaware of any form book giving a remainder beneficiary
who predeceases the distribution date a power of appointment over the
remainder interest.30
The reasons why powers of appointment are not commonly given
to remainder beneficiaries who predecease the distribution date are the
same reasons why transmissible future interests do not have the advan-
tages attributed to them by Dukeminier: If the remainder beneficiary
predeceases the life tenant, the remainder beneficiary's will can only
is presented as a good idea to do this is in the note attacking UPC § 2-707 that formed
the basis for his Upending Remainders article. See id. at 788-92.
129. Id. at 701-45.
130. I do not want to be understood as saying that no settlor has ever conferred a
power of appointment on a remainder beneficiary that is contingent on the remainder
beneficiary predeceasing the distribution date. I am merely saying that it would be unu-
sual to do so, and that no form book of which I am aware contains any such form. See
generally 1 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WILL DRAFTING
§ 16.38 (1992); 3 id. app. E, form 19.21-1; DRAFTING CALIFORNIA REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUSTS §§ 14.17-.22 & forms A-G (John R. Cohan ed., 3d ed. 1994); U.S. TRUST Co.,
PRACniCAL DRAFTING: WILL PROVISIONS form G-2c, at 27, form H-4d, at 36-37, form
H-5e, at 40-41 (1995); U.S. TRUST Co., PRACTICAL DRAFTING: TRUST PROVISIONS form C-
2, at 5, form C-4c, at 7, form C-5d, at 11, form C-7e, at 24, form D-7c, at 65 (1995).
Certainly, if the settlor wants the remainder beneficiary to have control of the dis-
position of his or her future interest on the distribution date if the remainder beneficiary
dies earlier, the settlor would be better advised to confer a power of appointment on the
remainder beneficiary rather than a transmissible future interest.
Moreover, in standard trusts giving the life tenant a power of appointment, settlors
might be well-advised to protect against the life tenant losing capacity to exercise the
power by granting each remainder beneficiary a special power over his or her remainder
interest. This power, however, would not be contingent on the remainder beneficiary
predeceasing the distribution date.
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appoint a future interest to the appointees, an interest that cannot benefit
the appointees before the life tenant dies, and cannot take into account
changes in family conditions occurring between the remainder benefici-
ary's death and the life tenant's death. In fact, the remainder interest
might not ever benefit the appointees because it might be contingent on
some event that does not happen, such as another person dying without
issue.
3. Inconsistency with the UPC's Increased Spousal Shares?
Professor Dukeminier makes another argument. He claims that sec-
tion 2-707 is somehow inconsistent with other major themes of the
1990 UPC revisions, specifically the decision to increase the intestate
share of a surviving spouse and the revision of the spouse's elective
share. Dukeminier writes: "It seems particularly odd that the UPC re-
visers in section 2-707 make it impossible for B to benefit B's spouse
any longer, inasmuch as the modem trend is to increase the protection
of the spouse." 3'
Dukeminier's argument confuses the settlor's intent with the re-
mainder beneficiaries' intent and the rights of the remainder benefi-
ciaries' spouses, such as the settlor's sons-in-law or daughters-in-law.
UPC section 2-707 seeks to implement the settlor's intent. In today's di-
vorce-prone and blended-family world, the evidence indicates that set-
tlors incline toward substituting the descendants, not the spouse, of a re-
mainder beneficiary who predeceases the distribution date. 32 During the
developmental stage of section 2-707, I brought to the Board a draft
that would have substituted the persons who would be the predeceased
remainder beneficiary's "heirs" if the remainder beneficiary died on the
distribution date, rather than his or her "descendants" surviving the dis-
tribution date. Substituting the remainder beneficiary's distribution-date
heirs would have included his or her surviving spouse (assuming that
the beneficiary's spouse was still living at the distribution date and had
not remarried). The practitioners on the Board rejected this version on
the ground that it would not carry out common intent.' 33
131. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 151. Dukeminier cites as exemplifying this
modem trend the UPC's provisions "relating to intestacy and the elective share." Id. at
152 (footnote omitted).
132. See also infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing the preference
of leading practitioners for substituting descendants). Settlors who do want to allow
sons-in-law or daughters-in-law to benefit (and some do) indicate this affirmatively by
granting the life tenant a special power to appoint among descendants and spouses of
descendants.
133. Cf infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing view of other es-
tate experts that § 2-207 furthers, not impedes, settlor's intent).
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As for the modem trend toward increasing the protection for sur-
viving spouses, that trend relates to the property of the deceased spouse,
not to trusts created by someone else, such as the parent or grandparent
of the deceased spouse. Neither the UPC nor any other probate code
grants an intestate share to sons-in-law or daughters-in-law, or to any
other relative by marriage, nor does it grant them an elective share in
the property of anyone other than their own spouses.1
34
4. No Empirical Evidence?
Professor Dukeminier accuses the UPC revisers of acting without
empirical evidence. 135 Although it is true that there is no systematic em-
pirical study supporting section 2-707,136 Dukeminier's claim that "[tihe
[UPC] drafters appear to be proceeding purely on their own specula-
tion"137 is wholly unjustified. Indeed, requiring a systematic empirical
study before any reform can be put into place would paralyze the law-
reform process. Neither the Uniform Law Commission nor the Ameri-
can Law Institute, the two premier national organizations devoted to
law reform, has funding for such studies. Dukeminier's claim might be
justified if the law-reform process were in the hands of amateurs who
know little about the field or the practice. In the specific case of the
UPC revisions, the process is in knowledgeable and experienced hands.
There is also plenty of evidence that capable estate planners, acting for
their clients, avoid transmissible future interests like the plague, and
that they ordinarily create remainders in the form of multiple-generation
class gifts with a survival requirement, which automatically substitute a
remainder beneficiary's descendants rather than his or her successors in
interest if the remainder beneficiary predeceases the distribution date.
In addition, I feel compelled to add that the Joint Editorial Board
for the Uniform Probate Code,138 the principal revisers of the UPC, is
an organization that counts among its members not only leading schol-
ars in the field but also nationally known estate planners of considera-
ble insight and experience. Specifically, Board membership includes
134. The UPC's elective share includes in the property subject to that share (called
the "augmented estate") property over which the decedent spouse had a general power
of appointment in a trust created by someone else, but only if the general power is ex-
pressly created and only if the general power is presently exercisable. See UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-205(1)(i) (1993).
135. See Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 149.
136. Nor is there a systematic empirical study supporting the common law judges
who in centuries past and for now-outdated reasons established the rule of early vesting
that produces transmissible future interests.
137. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 149-50.
138. See supra note 2.
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four past presidents and the president-elect of the American College of
Trust and Estate Counsel, four past chairs of the ABA Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, and the current president and a past
president of the International Academy of Estate and Trust Law, not to
mention the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the
Reporter and Associate Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property
(Donative Transfers). Their cumulative experience suggests that they
have a pretty good idea of what most clients want.
i might also add that two other groups of leading practitioners,
academics, and judges have, without dissent, recommended that the
Restatement (Third) of Property (Donative Transfers), a project of the
American Law Institute in process, include a section similar to section
2-707, substituting the descendants of remainder beneficiaries who pre-
decease the distribution date. 13 9
Lawyers experienced in drafting real trusts for real clients appear
to think that section 2-707 is intent-effecting, not intent-defeating.14
B. Why the UPC Did Not Give Remainder Beneficiaries Who
Predecease the Distribution Date a Power To Appoint the Remainder
Interest
Building on the dual but questionable propositions that "[t]he
transmissible vested remainder rule of the common law is a substitute
for a power of appointment overlooked by the settlor"' 141 and that
skilled estate planners give remainder beneficiaries rather than life te-
nants a power to appoint the remainder interest, Professor Dukeminier
cites an article by Professor Susan French, a colleague of his at the
UCLA School of Law. 42 French's article acknowledged that most com-
139. The two groups are the Members Consultative Group (MCG) for and the
Advisers to the Restatement (Third) of Property (Donative Transfers). The recommen-
dations came at the MCG meeting of September 29, 1995, and at the Advisers' meeting
of October 26, 1995. The credentials of these two groups of experienced practitioners,
judges, and legal-academics match up very well with those of the Joint Editorial Board.
There is in fact some overlap between the groups. Eight of the 23 Advisers are mem-
bers of or associated with the Joint Editorial Board.
140. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
141. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 151-52.
142. See id., at 165 n.52 (citing Susan F. French, Imposing a General Survival
Requirement on Beneficiaries of Future Interests: Solving the Problems Caused by the
Death of a Beneficiary Before the ime Set for Distribution, 27 ARIz. L. Rav. 801
(1985)). Dukeminier miscites the French article as one that "compared [the early vest-
ing rule and the antilapse-type rule] to what skilled estate planners do in creating
trusts." Id. at 165. The French article did advance her personal view that giving a de-
ceased remainder beneficiary a special power would be preferable to either rule, but did
not base this idea on or present any empirical evidence that this is "what skilled estate
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mentators favor a statute like section 2-707, but she proposed a modifi-
cation of that idea under which the beneficiary of a future interest who
predeceased the distribution date would be given a power of appoint-
ment.143 In Upending Remainders, Dukeminier embraces the French
proposal, describing the French article as "the most comprehensive ex-
amination of whether an antilapse statute is preferable to the common
law of remainders." 144
The French power-of-appointment proposal (now the Dukeminier-
French proposal) was not overlooked in the process of drafting section
2-707. The proposal was not adopted for three reasons. First, the theo-
retical basis for the proposal is questionable. Second, the proposal
would add an additional layer of complexity to an already intricate stat-
ute. Third, the number of remainder beneficiaries who would actually
exercise the power would be few and far between.
The settlor's intent controls the construction of trusts, 145 not the re-
mainder beneficiary's intent. To be persuasive, the Dukeminier-French
proposal for replacing transmissible future interests with special powers
of appointment in predeceasing remainder beneficiaries must be
grounded in the view that settlors deliberately create transmissible fu-
ture interests. The actual case law,146 the scholarship, 147 and the practice
of capable estate planning attorneys' 1" make that proposition highly
questionable. It appears far more likely that transmissible future inter-
ests are created by accident, by inadvertence, by drafting error.
Even if it were true that settlors deliberately create transmissible
future interests, the idea of statutorily conferring a power of appoint-
ment on deceased remainder beneficiaries is not as easily implemented
planners do in creating trusts." Dukeminier himself presents no empirical evidence that
this is "what skilled estate planners do in creating trusts." Id. And, of course, this is not
what skilled estate planners do in creating trusts. See supra note 126 and accompanying
text. Despite the lack of empirical evidence supporting his assertions, Dukeninier
charges "[the [UPC] drafters" with acting without empirical evidence and says that
they "appear to be proceeding purely on their own speculation." Dukeminier, supra
note 4, at 149-50.
143. See French, supra note 142, at 826. The article was prepared for but appar-
ently not acted upon by the California Law Revision Commission. In his casebook,
Dukeminier portrays French's proposal as "brilliant." See DUKEMMMR & JOHANSON,
supra note 77, at 791.
144. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 165.
145. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF PROPERTY (DONATIvE TRANSFERS) § 10.1 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, 1995) ("The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a
donative document is the donor's intention."). This was approved by the American Law
Institute at the 1995 Annual Meeting. 72 A.L.I. PRoc. (1996).
146. See supra notes 18-60 and accompanying text.
147. See supra section I.C.
148. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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as it appears, nor as simple as Dukeminier's article claims. It would not
be enough to confer a power of appointment on deceased remainder
beneficiaries and let it go at that. Because actual trusts are far more
complicated than the simplistic income-to-A-for-life, remainder-to-B ex-
ample, the statute would still have to establish a set of priorities to de-
termine which remainder beneficiary in a series of alternative remainder
interests has the power and under what circumstances. French under-
stood this point. Her article states:
[J]f the language [of a disposition] states that there is a remainder to A,
but if A dies without issue, to B, the statute should subject A to a general
survival requirement. If A dies without issue, the instrument substitutes B
for A. The statute imposes a general survival requirement on B, so that if
B dies before distribution, the statutory substitution for B will be made.
On the other hand, if A dies with issue, the statutory substitution for A
will be made (since the instrument provides no substitute for this
event). 14
9
When French uses the term "statutory substitution," she refers to the
deceased remainder beneficiary's appointee or, in the absence of an ap-
pointment, the statutory takers in default. Although French did not draft
statutory language that would implement this plan - describing what
result a statute should reach in a particular case is considerably easier
than drafting a statute that reaches that result in that case without mis-
handling other, unanticipated cases - section 2-707 does precisely that,
except that the "statutory substitution" under section 2-707 is the re-
mainder beneficiary's descendants who survive the distribution date. 50
Implementing the Dukeminier-French power-of-appointment pro-
posal would therefore not simplify section 2-707, but would complicate
it. The statute would still have to provide for substituting descendants in
case the power was not exercised. In addition, on the basis of the case
law, it appears that few, if any, deceased remainder beneficiaries would
be found to have exercised the power. French states (and Dukeminier
would presumably agree) that exercise of the statutorily conferred
power should "require[] an affirmative manifestation of intent.''m She
suggests that a regular residuary clause should not be taken as manifest-
ing such an intent, 52 and certainly dying intestate would not manifest
149. French, supra note 142, at 833-34.
150. See supra notes 7, 17, 69 & 89 and accompanying text.
151. French, supra note 142, at 821.
152. She suggests that "blanket exercises," but not regular residuary clauses,
"should be sufficient." Id. (citing Edward H. Rabin, Blind Exercises of Powers of
Appointment, 51 CoRNE± L.Q. 1 (1965)). A "blanket exercise" clause is a residuary
clause that purports to devise the residue of the testator's estate "and any property over
which I have a power of appointment." See Rabin, supra, at 1.
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such an intent. Under the case law, transmissible future interests usually
pass under regular residuary clauses or by intestacy.153 Consequently,
few remainder beneficiaries would be found to have exercised the
power.
In addition, the Dukeminier-French power-of-appointment proposal
opens up a series of additional questions not easily resolved or, once re-
solved, controlled by unambiguous statutory language. Dukeminier ac-
knowledged only a few of these questions. French did acknowledge and
discuss some of them, but did not decisively resolve them all. Here are
a few of the unanswered questions that come to mind: Should the bene-
ficiary have the power only if the beneficiary left surviving descend-
ants? A surviving spouse? Surviving when, surviving the beneficiary or
surviving the distribution date? Should the power be presently exercisa-
ble, or only testamentary? How broad should the objects of the power
be? Should the spouse be included, or only descendants? Should the
spouse only be included if the beneficiary also left surviving descend-
ants? Should the spouse only be included if the beneficiary left surviv-
ing descendants and those descendants were also descendants of the
surviving spouse? What language in the beneficiary's will should exer-
cise the power? A regular residuary clause? A blanket-exercise clause?
If the beneficiary did exercise the power, should the beneficiary's
appointees be required to survive the distribution date? What if one or
more of the beneficiary's appointees survived the beneficiary but prede-
ceased the distribution date? 54 Should those appointees, now benefi-
ciaries of the trust, also be given a power of appointment? Who should
take in default of the appointee's exercise of the power? The ap-
pointee's descendants who survive the distribution date? Or the original
remainder beneficiary's descendants who survive the distribution date?
What if neither the appointee nor the original remainder beneficiary had
descendants who survived the distribution date?
As these and many other questions would be considered and re-
solved, and the draft language tested against a variety of fact situations,
other questions would surely surface as the beleaguered drafters sought
to deal with the various permutations of possible future events. Reduc-
ing all these choices to statutory language would cause the statute to
153. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
154. In the cases cited supra note 88, one or more of the deceased remainder ben-
eficiaries' successors in interest also predeceased the distribution date. Take the simplis-
tic income-to-A-for-life, remainder-to-B trust. Suppose that B predeceases A, exercising
the power in favor of C. Suppose that C also predeceases A. Is B's exercise ineffective
because his appointee did not survive the distribution date, or does C have a power over
her remainder interest?
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grow ever larger in size and complexity and increase the possibility of
ambiguity and oversight.
A final point is this. Transmissible future interests have three dis-
advantages: (1) the remainder interest is included in the predeceased
beneficiary's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes; (2) the remain-
der interest must be traced through the predeceased beneficiary's pro-
bate estate to identify the beneficiary's successors in interest, and track
them down to see where they are and whether any have died in the
meantime (and if so, trace through their probate estates); and (3) the re-
mainder interest might end up outside the family or bloodlines. Section
2-707 in its current form solves all three problems: The remainder in-
terest is not taxed in the remainder beneficiary's estate, does not have to
be traced through the remainder beneficiary's estate or any intermediate
estates, and does not pass outside blood (or adopted) lines of descent.
Conferring a special power on the remainder beneficiary prevents the
property from being taxed in the remainder beneficiary's estate, 55 but it
does not avoid tracing to see whether the power was exercised and to
whom, and possibly tracing through additional estates if one or more
appointees predeceased the distribution date. Nor does it necessarily
prevent the property from passing outside the family or bloodlines. That
possibility would depend on the identities of the objects of the power
and of the appointees, and, should one or more appointee also prede-
cease the distribution date, that appointee's appointees or successors in
interest. Moreover,, this proposal also opens the potential for litigation
over the issue of whether the remainder beneficiary's will did in fact
exercise the power in borderline cases.
II. SUPPOSED PROBLEMS WITrH SECTION 2-707
After testing UPC section 2-707 against the actual case law, rather
than against a set of stacked hypothetical trusts of the type featured in
Professor Dukeminier's article, Professor Edward Halbach and I
concluded:
[N]o statute, no matter how deliberative or skillful the drafting process,
can be expected to give a satisfactory outcome to every conceivable set
of facts that may arise or that can be imagined by fertile minds. Every
statute will give a bad result from time to time. The only reasonable test
of a new statute is whether it advances the law by giving a satisfactory
result in a greater proportion of cases than the law it replaces and
155. Property subject to a special power of appointment is not included in the
powerholder's gross estate, but an exercise might subject it to the generation-skipping
transfer tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2601 (1994).
2342 [Vol. 94:2309
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2342 1995-1996
Uniform Probate Code
whether it does so with a minimum of litigation. Obviously, the framers
believe that [UPC section 2-707] meet[s] this test and, once enacted, will
serve the public well.
156
Ignoring this test, Dukeminier presents a group of outlier cases in an ef-
fort to give section 2-707 the appearance of inept draftsmanship and un-
just application. I will discuss only a selection of these charges, to give
the reader an idea of the type of claims he makes. To unravel the errors
in every one of his claims would unduly extend the length of this article
and stretch the reader's patience - not to mention my own.
A. Adverse Tax Implications?
Casting his now-familiar but simplistic and rarely seen income-to-
A-for-life, remainder-to-B trust in the form of an irrevocable inter vivos
trust, Professor Dukeminier attempts to show that section 2-707 can
create an unjust result and cause unnecessary taxation. In order to make
section 2-707 appear to work these injustices, he poses a fact situation
in which B predeceases A without leaving any descendants surviving A
and the settlor survives B but predeceases A. In this scenario,
Dukeminier claims that section 2-707 creates two problems. It deprives
the settlor of the opportunity to decide where the property should go
when A dies and it might cause the property to be taxed in the settlor's
estate under section 2037 of the Internal Revenue Code.
57
Dukeminier is quite wrong on both counts. His analysis is based
on a fundamental misunderstanding of what section 2-707 does. His er-
ror occurs when he says that "the settlor has a reversion"'158 if B dies
without descendants surviving the distribution date. Section 2-707 does
not give the settlor a reversion in that instance or in any other circum-
stance. In effect, what section 2-707 does is to transform the remainder
interest from one that is indefeasibly vested in B into one in favor of B
if B survives A, but if not to B's descendants surviving A, and if none to
those persons who would be the settlor's heirs if the settlor died when A
dies. 59 Under section 2-707, the property would not revert to the settlor
even if the settlor survived A.'6 Nor would the settlor want it to, for ir-
revocable inter vivos trusts are normally created for tax reasons - to
subject the creation of the trust to the gift tax, avoiding the estate tax.
156. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1149.
157. See Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 156-57.
158. Id. at 157.
159. See UNII. PROB. CODE §§ 2-707(b)(1), (d)(2); 2-711 (1993).
160. There is nothing in UPC § 2-711 preventing it from determining the persons
who would be the settlor's heirs at the distribution date, even if the settlor is then still
alive. See UNiF. PROB. CODE § 2-711 (1993).
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Irrevocable inter vivos trusts lose their tax advantage if the settlor re-
tains a power or property interest in the trust. Section 2-707 is quite
consistent with the tax objective normally associated with irrevocable
trusts. The settlor has already paid a gift tax when creating the trust (or
used up some of his or her unified credit); the last thing that the settlor
wants is to get the property back, potentially subjecting the property to
a second transfer tax when he or she later disposes of it by gift or will.
Dukeminier is quite wrong when he says that the property is included in
the settlors's gross estate under section 2037 if the settlor dies before A.
Dukeminier's intent analysis is also quite flawed. It creates a false
choice. Dukeminier claims that section 2-707 deprives the settlor of the
ability to decide who should get the property when A dies.16' But
neither the common law nor Dukeminier's power of appointment propo-
sal gives the settlor that choice. Both would give the choice to B. With-
out section 2-707, the remainder would pass through B's estate, even
though B's descending line had died out by the distribution date. UPC
section 2-707 avoids that result and instead gives the property at A's
death to the persons who would be the settlor's heirs if the settlor died
when A died. These persons are, after all, the settlor's closest living rel-
atives as of the date when the trust is dissolved and the property is dis-
tributed, and it seems reasonable to give the property directly to the set-
tlor's closest living relatives when A dies.
On another tax point, Dukeminier acknowledges that section 2-707
prevents the remainder interest from being taxed in the predeceased
beneficiary's gross estate under the estate tax, but he also states that
section 2-707 can cause the trust property to be taxed under the federal
generation-skipping transfer tax (GST tax). 62 The GST tax would apply
to the extent that "skip persons" (beneficiaries who are more than one
generation below the transferor) receive the property on the distribution
date. The GST tax, however, only applies to larger estates. Each donor
has a $1 million GST exemption. 63 Even Dukeminier concedes that
161. Dukeminier states:
Where an inter vivos trust fails for some reason, and a resulting trust or equitable
reversion arises in the settlor, the settlor has a second chance to fill a gap in the
disposition or to correct otherwise the flaw in the original trust. Under section 2-
707, the settlor cannot say what is to be done with the property unless the settlor
survives the termination of the trust. Why the 1990 UPC revisers chose to pass
the property upon the termination of the trust to the settlor's heirs, who might not
be the objects of the settlor's bounty, rather than in accordance with the settlor's
direction in his will or through his residuary clause is inexplicable.
Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 157.
162. See id. at 163.
163. See I.R.C. § 2631 (1994).
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"numerous factors may come into play in any individual case" and
therefore "it is not possible to say whether the present transmissible re-
mainder rule or section 2-707 will be more advantageous to taxpay-
ers." 16 Because section 2-707 only applies to poorly drafted trusts,
however, it is doubtful that very many trusts covered by section 2-707
will exceed the GST exemption amount of $1 million per donor.
65
B. Distinguishing "Legal" from "Equitable" Remainders?
Section 2-707 only applies to future interests "under the terms of a
trust."' 66 The rationale, explained in the Official Commentary, is to pre-
vent the statute from interfering with the possibility of a life tenant and
remainderman of a nontrust disposition of land joining together to sell
the land in fee simple absolute.' 67
Professor Dukeminier asserts that restricting section 2-707 to trust
future interests "may revive old learning, thought obsolescent, about
whether the Statute of Uses applies to the particular [trust] instrument
and converts legal interests into equitable ones," and may make it nec-
essary to determine whether a trust document creates a "legal" or "eq-
uitable" remainder.1 68 Section 2-707, however, is not restricted to equi-
164. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 163.
165. Even in the rare case of UPC § 2-707 applying to a trust large enough in
value to be potentially subject to the GST tax, there may be occasional relief coming in
the form of an amendment to the "predeceased-ancestor" exception of the GST tax.
Under the "predeceased-ancestor" exception, a transfer to a grandchild of the transferor
or of the transferor's spouse or former spouse is not treated as a particular type of gen-
eration-skipping transfer called a "direct skip" if, "as of the time of the transfer," the
grandchild's parent is dead. See I.R.C. § 2612(c)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). The trans-
fer to a beneficiary more than one generation below the transferor taking place when a
trust is distributed is a different type of generation-skipping transfer called a "taxable
termination." Bills pending in Congress extend the predeceased-ancestor exception to
all types of generation-skipping transfers, including taxable terminations. In order to ap-
ply to a taxable termination, however, the grandchild's parent must have been dead
when the trust was created; the exception would still not apply if the parent was living
when the trust was created but died before the distribution date. See H.R. 2491, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 14634 (passed by the House on Oct. 26, 1995); S. 1357, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 12304 (passed by the Senate on Oct. 27, 1995).
166. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707(b) (1993).
167. See UNn. PROB. CODE § 2-707 cmt. (1993). A state with a suitable statutory
provision authorizing a life tenant to give a fee simple title might consider lifting the re-
striction to trust future interests. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2930 (1979); N.Y.
REAL PROP. ACrs. LAW §§ 1602-1613 (McKinney 1979); LEwIs M. SIMES & CLARENCE
B. TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 237 (1960); William F.
Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972
DUKE LJ. 517.
168. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 160.
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table remainders as such.169 The section only applies to future interests
"under the terms of a trust," a defined term making it clear that section
2-707 applies if the future interest was created by the "terms" of a
trust.1 70 The question here is whether a trust document (or, in the rare
case of an oral trust of personal property, whether the terms of the oral
trust) created the future interest, not whether the future interest created
by the trust document is "legal" or "equitable.'' Contrary to
Dukeminier's claim, section 2-707 does not revive "old learning,
thought obsolescent," nor does it distinguish between "legal" and "eq-
uitable" remainders.
C. Trust Termination Before the Distribution Date Made More
Difficult?
Under American law, the beneficiaries of a trust can join together
to terminate a trust before the distribution date. Doing so requires the
consent of all possible beneficiaries and proof that no "material pur-
pose" of the trust would be defeated by the premature termination.
72
Citing once again the simplistic but unrealistic income-to-A-for-life, re-
mainder-to-B trust, Professor Dukeminier asserts that "[s]ection 2-707
makes it more difficult to terminate trusts.' 1 73  Theoretically,
Dukeminier is correct because section 2-707 creates a substitute future
interest in remainder beneficiaries' descendants, a class that includes
potentially unborn persons who cannot give the required consent. As a
practical matter, however, the point is not as significant as Dukeminier
makes it appear. Even under current law, very few trusts can be termi-
169. The term equitable future interest never appears in the statutory text or offi-
cial commentary to § 2-707.
170. See UNIn. PROB. CODE § 2-707(a)(6) (1993).
171. See RESTATEMET (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (de-
fining "terms of the trust" as "the manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect
to the trust provisions expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceed-
ings") (emphasis added); see also id. cmt. c ("If a trust is created by will, the terms of
the trust are determined by the provisions of the will ... ."); id. cmt. d ("If a trust is
created by a transaction inter vivos and is evidence by a written instrument, the terms of
the trust are determined by the provisions of the governing instrument .... ."); id. cmt.
e ("If a trust is created by a transaction inter vivos and is not evidenced by a written
instrument, the terms of the trust are determined by such evidence of the intention of
the settlor with respect to the trust as is not barred from consideration because of a
Statute of Frauds or some other rule of law."); id. cmt. f ("If a trust is established by an
order of court and is to be administered as an express trust, the terms of the trust are
determined by the provisions of the court order . . ... "). This was approved by the
American Law Institute at the 1996 Annual Meeting. 73 A.L.I. PRoc. (forthcoming
1997).
172. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1957).
173. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 159.
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nated before the distribution date. The usual rule is that spendthrift
trusts, discretionary trusts, trusts for support, and postponement-of-en-
joyment trusts contain a "material purpose" and cannot be termi-
nated.174 Typical trust forms include a boilerplate spendthrift provision,
and many trusts grant discretionary powers or discretionary-support
powers to the trustee. In addition, most trusts create future interests in
classes that are still subject to open, thus preventing premature termina-
tion. The fact that section 2-707 creates a substitute gift to descendants
of remainder beneficiaries who predecease the distribution date does not
make many trusts nonterminable that were not otherwise nonterminable
anyway.
Of course, giving the remainder beneficiary a special power, as
Dukeminier suggests, would not solve the trust termination problem, ei-
ther. As pointed out above, the statute would still have to name takers
in default, a group that would include potentially unborn persons. The
takers in default of a special power are counted as trust beneficiaries
who must give their consent to the termination of the trust. 75
In any event, there is an easy solution to the trust termination
problem. It is to add a section resembling the California statutory provi-
sion that permits a guardian ad litem to consent to termination or modi-
fication on behalf of "a beneficiary who lacks legal capacity, including
a minor, or who is an unascertained or unborn person."' 76 In writing the
Official Commentary to section 2-707, I probably should have recom-
mended enactment .of a provision similar to that California provision.
When the Uniform Probate Code revisions were in process, the
Uniform Law Commission was expected to begin work on a Uniform
Trust Act that would incorporate such a provision. As it has turned out,
the Uniform Trust Act project was delayed, although it is now under
way and will almost certainly include such a provision.
D. More Perpetuity Violations?
Professor Dukeminier asserts that section 2-707 will cause
perpetuity violations. The example he gives is hardly a real-world ex-
174. See DuKE iNiER & JOHANSON, supra note 77, at 658 ("Generally, a trust can-
not be terminated if it is a spendthrift trust, if the beneficiary is not to receive the prin-
cipal until attaining a specified age, if it is a discretionary trust, or if it is a trust for sup-
port of the beneficiary.").
175. See EUGENE F. ScotEs & EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIAL
ON DECEDENTs' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 481 (5th ed. 1993).
176. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15405 (West 1991); see also Hatch v. Riggs Natl. Bank,
361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (authorizing the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent unborn and unascertained beneficiaries).
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ample: "For A for life, then to A's children for their lives, then to B.' '
As with his income-to-A-for-life, remainder-to-B example, a two-gener-
ation trust with an indefeasibly vested remainder to a named individual
is occasionally useful in law school casebooks and classroom presenta-
tions. But as a real-world trust that responsible legislative drafters have
to be concerned about, I have trouble taking this example seriously.
What rational person would want to name a remainder beneficiary who
is almost certain to be deceased at the distribution date, without provid-
ing for an alternative remainder, such as one to B's descendants surviv-
ing the distribution date?
In any event, in analyzing his two-generation trust with an indefea-
sibly vested remainder to a named individual, Dukeminier assumes that
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities governs the case. He prop-
erly points out that section 2-707 does not cause B's remainder to vio-
late the common-law Rule, but instead creates a substitute gift in B's
descendants that would violate the Rule and be void. Dukeminier ne-
glects the fact that the Uniform Probate Code is an integrated code.
Most provisions are drafted on the assumption that every other provi-
sion has been enacted. The Code contains the freestanding Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP), 78 under which the substi-
tute gift to B's descendants would not be void ab initio, but would be
given ninety years in which to vest. 79 And a few other states have en-
acted a different version of the wait-and-see approach or have adopted
some other provision that liberalizes the common-law Rule. Under
USRAP, if A's last surviving child dies within ninety years, the substi-
tute gift would be valid. If A's last surviving child lives beyond ninety
years, the substitute gift would still not be invalid; the gift would be ju-
dicially reformed to give a vested interest to B's descendants living
ninety years after the trust was created. 80
177. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-901 to -907 (1993). The USRAP has been enacted
in 24 states.
179. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-901(a)(2) (1993).
180. See UNI PROB. CODE § 2-903 (1993). Dukeminier does not mention that the
USRAP is part of the Uniform Probate Code. He does, however, misleadingly portray
what would happen "if" the jurisdiction has adopted USRAP. See Dukeminier, supra
note 4, at 159. He asserts that the outcome of a reformation suit would be
"[un]predictable" and "a godsend to lawyers." Id. As pointed out in the text above,
however, the outcome would be not be unpredictable, nor would the lawsuit be other
than routine. As Example (1) in the Official Commentary to USRAP § 3 (UPC § 2-903)
makes clear, the substitute gift to B's descendants would be reformed to make it vest in
interest (not in possession) 90 years after the trust was created. See UNiv. STATUTORY R.
AGAINsT PERPETUITIES wrrH 1990 AMENDMENTs § 3 example 1 (1990).
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Before leaving the subject of perpetuities, I should add that the
Dukeminier-French proposal to confer a special power on deceased re-
mainder beneficiaries would increase, not decrease, the possibility of a
perpetuity violation. Under both USRAP and the common-law Rule, the
perpetuity period starts running on the exercise of a special power from
the time that the original trust was created, not from the time that the
power was exercised.'8' A remainder beneficiary who would actually
exercise the special power in further trust, say, for the life of the re-
mainder beneficiary's children, would blunder into a perpetuity viola-
tion if one or more of his or her children were born after the original
trust was created.182
E. Wholesale Revision of Trust Forms?
The Dukeminier article gives the impression that UPC section 2-
707 interferes with mainstream estate planning. It does not. Section 2-
707 only applies to poorly drafted trusts, the type of trust that so often
becomes embroiled in litigation. Capable estate planners need not fear
that UPC section 2-707 will interfere with their work product or that
they will have to "revise their trust forms."'8 3 Since section 2-707 only
applies to poorly drafted trusts, the only practitioners who will have to
revise their forms are those who ought to revise their forms, such as the
practitioners who drafted the dispositions in Krooss, Bomberger,
Lawson, Gustafson, Cox, Edwards, Peadro, and De Korwin,184 not to
mention the outlier dispositions used by Dukeminier in Upending
Remainders.
181. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-902 (1993).
182. French, but not Dukeminier, acknowledges this point. French dismisses the
problem by saying that "the Rule should cause little difficulty" in a jurisdiction that
adopts the wait-and-see method of perpetuity reform (which is the reform that USRAP
adopts). See French, supra note 142, at 823.
183. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 165. Were he right about this, would not the
Dukeminier-French proposal to confer a power of appointment on remainder benefi-
ciaries predeceasing the distribution date also require a learning of new rules and revi-
sion of forms?
184. In re Krooss, 99 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1951); In re Bomberger's Estate, 32 A.2d
729 (Pa. 1943); Lawson v. Lawson, 148 S.E.2d 546 (N.C. 1966); In re Gustafson, 547
N.E.2d 1152 (N.Y. 1989); Cox v. Forristall, 640 P.2d 878 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Ed-
wards v. Bender, 25 So. 1010 (Ala. 1899); Peadro v. Peadro, 81 N.E.2d 192 (Il. 1948);
De Korwin v. First Natl., 179 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982
(1950).
2349'June 1996]
HeinOnline  -- 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2349 1995-1996
Michigan Law Review
CONCLUSION
Professor Dukeminier begins his article by saying that "[niothing
is more settled in the law of remainders than that an indefeasibly vested
remainder is transmissible to the remainderman's heirs or devisees upon
the remainderman's death."' 18 5 He constructs his case for transmissible
future interests on an indefeasibly vested remainder, in the form of an
income-to-A-for-life, remainder-to-B trust. This sort of simplistic trust is
seldom seen in real-world practice. Focusing on indefeasibly vested re-
mainders is calculated to give the false impression that transmissible fu-
ture interests are deliberately created "to cede control of the remainder
to the remainderman to permit the remainderman to deal with changes
in his family circumstances during the life tenant's life."' 18 6 To accept
Dukeminier's thesis that section 2-707 is "revolutionary," based
"purely on [the drafters'] own speculation," bereft of empirical evi-
dence showing "that the common law has read people wrong for centu-
ries," "retrogressive," and "a piece of feudalism redivivus,"' 18 7 one
must disregard the Cox-Edwards line of authority, 88 the literature re-
proving transmissible future interests, 189 and the experience of those
who drafted and approved section 2-707.190 One must also accept two
propositions - (1) that practitioners deliberately create transmissible
future interests in order to grant remainder beneficiaries the power to
adjust to changed family circumstances and (2) that remainder benefi-
ciaries and their attorneys recognize transmissible future interests when
they see them, anticipate that the usually younger remainder beneficiary
might predecease the usually older life tenant, and craft their wills to
make specific disposition of their remainder interests should they die
during the lifetime of the life tenant.
Usually, however, transmissible future interests are the product of
mistake or lack of forethought on the part of the drafting attorney.' 9'
Capable estate planners avoid transmissible future interests like the
plague. The case law bears out the proposition that transmissible future
interests are usually created by inadvertence. I find it hard to believe
that the settlors in the actual cases discussed in this article realized that
their dispositions created transmissible future interests. Certainly none
of the actual remainder beneficiaries did what Dukeminier claims sec-
185. Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 148 (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id. at 148, 150, 166.
188. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
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tion 2-707 deprives him or her of the flexibility of doing - disposing
of the remainder interest "to deal with changes in his family circum-
stances during the life tenant's life." Finally, I find it hard to believe
that the actual settlors in the poorly drafted trusts discussed in this arti-
cle would have been satisfied with the outcome when the transmissible
remainder interest ended up in the hands of outsiders. Far easier to be-
lieve is that most settlors of these and other poorly drafted trusts would
endorse the outcome under section 2-707.
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